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Abstract 
The changing shape of the international system in the post-Cold War era has demanded that 
theorists and practitioners re-evaluate the nature of security in the analysis of International 
Relations in the modern world. While realist conceptions of security are still pivotal in determining 
the actions of states, the increasing prevalence of transnational threats and security 
interdependence has facilitated the rise of regionally coherent subsystems within which the pursuit 
of security cannot be achieved in the absence of cooperation. Despite modern advancements in 
technology and transportation, the reality remains that security threats have a higher capability to 
travel over short distances rather than long, and the capacity of most states to project power 
beyond their own regional sphere is relatively limited. Consequently, the interplay between 
geography and anarchy in the current international system has facilitated the rise of regional 
security complexes (RSCs), whereby geographically proximate states are bound within a distinct 
regional dynamic; be it conflict or cooperation. The regionalist perspective has sought to emphasize 
that security at the regional level is autonomous and distinguishable from the dynamics of the global 
and domestic levels and that, whilst each regional space is unique, particular variables are 
comparable and highlight interactions that would not occur were it not for the existence of a RSC.   
The purpose of this thesis is to utilise the theoretical framework of Regional Security Complex 
Theory (RSCT) in order to cross-compare two different regions; Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. 
Southeast Asia has been widely accepted as an autonomous regional construct and experiences a 
web of security interdependence which ensures that the security concerns of its units cannot be 
analysed or resolved apart from one another. The South Pacific, by contrast, has been largely 
ignored in the literature on regional security and has otherwise been categorized as being 
unstructured and too weak in its dynamic to constitute a security complex in its own right. The 
objective of this thesis is to outline the variables of the essential structure of a RSC so as to ascertain 
whether the characterization of the South Pacific as being unstructured holds true. The additional 
objective of this thesis is to map and cross-compare the regional security architecture of the South 
Pacific to that of Southeast Asia in order to highlight and pinpoint what differences exist, what they 
say about the region itself, and how they may be explained.    
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Chapter One - Introduction, Purpose and Chapter Breakdown 
1.1 Introduction 
In the post-Cold War era security interdependence has become a reality, “security issues today 
cannot, by and large, be solved by states acting alone.”1 The idea of security cooperation in the 
international system is nothing new and that tracing back to the Westphalian system, and beyond, 
we can see that throughout history many states have sought to strategically cooperate with other 
sovereign units, where necessary, in order to achieve similar gains. Collective defence and collective 
security policies have been central in the past and, through both World Wars, alliance systems based 
on these notions have aligned states through mutual obligation and have sought to balance the 
over-arching and anarchical structure of the international system. However, in the wake of the Cold 
War, the international security environment has experienced a significant transformation, whereby 
the state, while still a dominant unit, is not as overwhelmingly so and where peace and stability are 
derived from more than just a balance-of-power in the pursuit of protecting national sovereignty. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequential dissolution of overarching bipolarity, the 
pursuit of stability and security for a majority of the world’s states has taken on a new form. In the 
contemporary international security environment major concerns have spread beyond the 
traditional military and political sectors, and the additional perspective has emerged such that rules, 
rather than power, can determine the limits of action.2 As a result, scholars and practitioners have 
expanded their scope outside of the state and the global level of analysis and have acknowledged 
that, given the density of security interactions that occur within concentrated regional groupings, 
the regional level represents a viable area of security analysis and an autonomous subsystem in its 
own right. 
The regionalist perspective has surfaced as one of the key theoretical approaches for analysing the 
structure of international security in the post-Cold War era. This perspective argues that regions, as 
groupings3 of proximate states embedded within a historical and geographical context, represent 
areas where security interdependence is particularly intense. The degree of interconnectedness 
“stems from the simple mechanism... by which threats, particularly political and military ones, are 
                                                          
1
 Jim Rolfe, ‘Regional Security for the Asia-Pacific: Ends and Means’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30, no. 1 
(2008), p. 101. 
2
 Rolfe, 2008; 100. 
3
 The conceptualisation of the term ‘region’ as both a social and geographical construct will be discussed in 
more depth in a following chapter. 
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most strongly felt when they are at close range.”4 It is on this central assumption that Barry Buzan 
offers Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as a means of helping to explain the unique 
dynamics that take place at the regional level. 
In their simplest form “regions have been typically defined as geographically proximate and 
independent states and regionalism as attempts at formal cooperation between such states.”5 
However, it has been the acknowledgement of ‘security complexes’ that has emphasised the need 
for more depth in the conceptualisation of these notions. The interlinked nature of security 
complexes ensures that in order to successfully combat threats experienced across a wider region, 
durable stability and security is only achievable through cooperation and coordination by all actors – 
insofar that threats cannot be wholly mitigated unless all actors agree to approach the issue in a 
harmonized manner. In the post-Cold War period regionalism has emerged as one of the more 
favourable means of confronting transnational security threats and generally describes the projects 
developed to facilitate peace and security in certain issue areas within a regional context. The rise of 
regionalism, as a result, has given way to a budding phase of multilateral institution building in a 
variety of areas around the world, albeit with varied success.  
Founded in the post-World War Two period, and as a means of re-building the embittered 
relationships within Europe, the European Union represents the most common and notable 
multilateral institution developed on a regional level. Since inception, and its humble beginnings as 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Union remains the prototypical 
illustration of how a regional bloc can manage its dynamics in a cooperative way. By the late 1990s 
the European Community had flourished into a supranational institution that managed issues 
transcending all sectors of society and politics. In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon announced the 
community’s transformation to the European Union – a formal regional organisation with a common 
market and a distinct infrastructure of institutions managing a range of issue areas – governance, 
law and justice, environment, foreign affairs and security, education, development and economy. In 
many regards the ‘legal personality’ of the European Union has enabled it to move beyond a distinct 
regional focus and is now regarded as a viable actor within the international system itself. 
Nonetheless, the evolution of the European Union has been a unique transformation. The underlying 
conditions that have facilitated the progression from economic integration to the development of a 
‘mature security community’ are conditions that do not exist, and are unlikely to ever exist, 
elsewhere in the world. It is for this reason that, when considering other regional blocs and the 
                                                          
4
 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 
(Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited, 1991), p. 188. 
5
 Joseph Nye (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston, United States: Little Brown and Co, 1968), p. xii.  
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relative success of the multilateral organisations developed within them, it is important to avoid the 
temptation to gauge the evolution of these institutions on the basis of the European Union’s 
success. Two such regional institutions that have developed in a context that is a strong contrast to 
that of Europe have been the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Pacific Island 
Forum (PIF). Both organisations have been regarded as the ‘drivers’ of regionalism in their respective 
regions and have, incrementally over the past several decades,6 sought to establish a framework of 
norms and rules upon which to coherently combat the shared security concerns within their 
particular regions. 
1.2 Purpose of this thesis 
In the process of conceptualising the region as a subset of the international system, Buzan argues 
that regional structures can exist in one of three distinct ways. Firstly, overlay describes those spaces 
where the presence of great powers is so intense within the region that it suppresses all local 
security dynamics. Secondly, a Regional Security Complex (RSC) exemplifies a space in which a set of 
units within a distinct geographical boundary experience security interdependencies that are so 
intense and intertwined that the processes of (de)securitisation for these units cannot be considered 
or resolved apart from one another.7 Thirdly, unstructured regions comprise the leftover space and 
combine proximate local states that are so weak that their focus is largely internal and thus 
“generate insufficient security interdependence”8 to satisfy the essential structure of a regional 
security complex.  
Despite Buzan’s critical assessment that the South Pacific region exemplifies a prototypical example 
of an unstructured region, since decolonisation and largely in the post-Cold War era, the islands 
within the South Pacific have recognised that the fate of their security is interlinked with each other 
and cannot be resolved in the absence of a collective approach to threat mitigation. Security 
cooperation as a means of combating trans-boundary crime is a fundamental focus within the region 
and has emerged as one of the four modern pillars of the region’s organisational body, the Pacific 
Island Forum (PIF). 
The first objective of this thesis is to utilise Buzan’s conceptual framework of Regional Security 
Complex Theory (RSCT) to analyse the extent to which a Regional Security Complex (RSC) is present 
                                                          
6
 Whilst the organisations themselves may only date back 43 years and 39 years respectively, the roots of 
these organisations do date back slightly further in their antecedents.  
7
 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security (New York, United 
States: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 44. Defined in full as being a situation where “local states have 
such low capability that their own power does not project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries; and 
second, where geographical insulation makes interaction difficult.” (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 62). 
8
 Buzan & Waever, 2003; 492. 
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within the South Pacific - even if this is only in its most nascent stage. The second objective is to 
analyse how the evolution of the security architecture within this regional space may compare to 
that of the region’s nearest neighbour, Southeast Asia. This cross-comparison is significant in that 
Southeast Asia represents a relatively intense RSC that shares several key characteristics with the 
South Pacific; namely, they are comprised of traditionally non-western nation-states that have 
suffered strongly at the hands of both colonisation and Cold War overlay. As a result, the states 
within both regions have sought to initiate cooperative security projects through regional 
institutions amidst post-World War Two state-making and share the same underlying desire to 
minimise the assistance required from extra-regional powers and solve their own problems, on their 
own terms, from within. 
1.3 Propositions  
1. First, I propose that the South Pacific does possess the necessary characteristics to be 
defined as a Regional Security Complex. I propose that this may be illustrated by translating 
the four features of the essential structure of a RSC to the dynamics of the South Pacific.  
2. Second, in the short modern history of independent states within the South Pacific, 
regionalism has been a consistent feature, even if the relative effectiveness of these regional 
initiatives have been highly criticised. I propose that, while a complex exists, it is still loose 
and developing, thus the nature of this complex reflects the region’s inefficient attempts to 
coordinate its mutual security concerns. I propose that the shortcomings of the South 
Pacific, and its preeminent regional institution the Pacific Island Forum, can be highlighted 
by cross-comparing the evolution of its regional security architecture to that of its nearest 
neighbour, Southeast Asia. 
1.4 Chapter Breakdown 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters including this introductory chapter and a conclusion. 
Chapter one includes an introduction, the purpose of this thesis, its propositions and a breakdown of 
its chapter structure. Chapter two outlines a brief history of post-Cold War security and maps the 
emergence of the regionalist perspective. Chapter three outlines the theoretical framework 
underpinning this thesis. As conceptualised by Barry Buzan ‘Regional Security Complex Theory’ takes 
a systematic approach to understanding the relationship between security and the regional level. 
RSCT highlights four key variables that determine the existence and dynamics of a RSC: boundary, 
anarchic structure, polarity and, social construction. By mapping these features within regions RSCT 
allows for a methodical cross-comparison to take place. Chapter four is an application of RSCT to the 
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dynamics of Southeast Asia and is an outline of the four variables within the Southeast Asian 
context. Chapter five is an application of RSCT to the dynamics of the South Pacific and is an outline 
of the four variables within the South Pacific context. Chapter six is a cross-comparative analysis of 
the previous two chapters and discusses the nature of both RSCs, as well as their attempts at 
regionalism and securitization as a means of dealing with the dynamics of a RSC. Chapter seven 
utilises the knowledge gained from the cross-comparative analysis to outline the major findings of 
this thesis and to suggest what future areas for development may exist. 
1.5 Methodology 
The methodological approach of this thesis is a qualitative and research-based approach utilising 
primary and secondary sources of information. It’s theoretical framework is been largely derived 
from the works of Barry Buzan and his colleagues at the Copenhagen School of security studies, Ole 
Waever and Jaap de Wilde. Buzan’s individual and collaborative work, as outlined in Regions and 
Powers, People, States and Fear, and Security: A New Framework for Analysis, have all been critical 
to the application and understanding of this framework. Sources of information also include press 
releases and official statements from both ASEAN and the PIF, reports by academic observers, 
journal articles, newspaper articles, government documents, web pages and conference/working 
papers. Whilst a wealth of literature exists in regards to RSCT and Southeast Asia, literature on the 
South Pacific has been harder to come by. I have sought to accumulate a range of sources in order to 
encapsulate the opinions of regionalist advocates and critics.     
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Chapter Two - Post-Cold War Security and the International Relations of Regions 
Few would object to the statement that, in the wake of the Cold War, the international system has 
experienced a dynamic shift. The over-arching bipolar structure of the international security 
environment collapsed with the demise of the Soviet Union and many international relations 
scholars have sought to explain the dynamics of this transformation, its principal features and what 
it means for the future of security affairs in the international system.  The end of the Cold War 
“brought about devolution to strategic affairs”9 and created a new international security 
environment that was “a marked shift away from global-level security concerns and towards local 
and regional ones.”10 Amidst the emergence of various perspectives, a focus on regions in the 
international system has attracted renewed interest and “has been foregrounded in the analysis of 
international politics, has emerged as the locus of international economic activity, and for organizing 
security and resolving conflict.”11 
Prior to this devolution, and with its pinnacle at the height of the Cold War, international relations 
has been strongly embedded in the very premise that “the state is and should be about security, 
with emphasis on military and political security.”12  Traditionally this saw the state as the central 
focus and national sovereignty as the ultimate goal. The contemporary doctrine of state 
sovereignty13 may be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 with the emergence of the 
nation-state 14 and its predominance as the key unit within the international system. It was from 
here that the concept of a state developed and was used to describe an autonomous political unit 
that was geographically bound within a certain territory. Stability and order was then maintained by 
a “centralized government with the power to collect taxes, draft men for work or war, and decree 
and enforce laws”15 and ultimately was, in the traditional Weberian sense, “an institution claiming to 
exercise monopoly of legitimate force within a particular territory.”16   
                                                          
9
 Hans Maull, ‘Security Cooperation in Europe and Pacific Asia: A Comparative Analysis’, Journal of East Asian 
Affairs, 19, no. 2 (2005), p. 68. 
10
 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London, England: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 61. 
11
 Deepak Nair, ‘Regionalism in Asia Pacific/East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism?’, Contemporary Southeast 
Asia, 3, no. 1 (2009), p. 110. 
12
 Buzan et al, 1998; 37. 
13
 Robert Patman, Globalisation, Sovereignty, and the Transformation of New Zealand Foreign Policy 
(Wellington, New Zealand: Centre of Strategic Studies, 2005). [online] <http:\\www.victoria.ac.nz/css/working-
papers/WP21/pdf> [accessed 10 September 2010]. 
14
 The traditional notion of the state is predominantly attributed to Max Weber, in which the state is 
necessitated upon its monopoly use of and/or licensing of violence within a given territory. 
15
 Robert Carneiro, ‘A Theory of the Origin of the State’, Science, New Series. 169, no. 3947 (1970), p. 733. 
16
 Patman, 2005; 5. 
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It is from this realist perspective and in the Westphalian world of strong states17 that the state 
represents the referent objective of security and the aim is to maintain its sovereignty and thereby 
protect the integrity of the state. The management of threats is largely outward looking as this state-
centric view of security rests on the assumption that, by default, if the state is secure then that 
security transfers to those that occupy the state.  Internal conflict in a strong state is less of a danger 
and thus security concerns are derived from between states and not from within. Military strategy 
through deterrence and balance-of power have been fundamental to understanding the role of 
states as independent units and their interactions within the ‘anarchical international system’.  
The 1990s marked a re-conceptualisation of security and saw the scope of traditional security 
analysis expand beyond the state and beyond the military and political sphere. In the new and 
emerging security environment, scholars and practitioners were forced to broaden the levels and 
sectors in which they viewed security relations, as the end of the Cold War coincided with not only a 
structural shift but an ideational one - “the latter essentially being the replacement of traditional 
polarized security views by the principles of cooperative security.”18 It has been in this new 
environment and through a multitude of multilateral organisations that war has become increasingly 
regarded as an unthinkable action and it has been rules and norms, rather than power, which has 
been argued as a means of determining the limits of action.19 However, this is still only one such 
perspective and it is important to note that there are many that still adhere to the realist ideal that, 
despite their membership within rule and/or norm based organisations, states still act on an 
individual and nationalistic basis and that these organisations are used as another means of hedging 
bets and pursuing national aspirations.   
The disbandment of the Soviet Union essentially meant that nature and scope of the international 
system was no longer at the mercy of a “system-level pattern of great power relationships.”20 Local 
dynamics, more so than ever before, became free to take on their own shape - while this meant 
heightened conflict and insecurity in some areas; it meant diminishing conflict and heightened 
cooperation in others. The extent to which the rivalry of the Cold War impacted on local and 
regional internal dynamics was not altogether felt until the overlay, that had stagnated its 
development, was removed in the 1990s. Overlay is essentially a process in which “the interests of 
external great powers transcend mere penetration, and come to dominate a region so heavily that 
                                                          
17
 Strong states being at far less risk of internal conflict. 
18
 Brian L. Job, Alliances’ and Regional Security Developments: The Role of Regional Arrangements in the UN’s 
Promotion of Peace and Stability (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University, 2003), p. 12. [online] 
<http://unu.edu/millennium/job.pdf> [accessed 24 August 2010]. 
19
 Rolfe, 2008; 100. 
20
 Buzan et al, 1998; 61. 
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the local security dynamics of security interdependence virtually cease to exist.”21 During the Cold 
War - and in the wake of decolonisation - many distinct regions of the world, such as East Asia and 
Africa, became more diverse with postcolonial independence and the emergence of many new 
nation-states. These regions were simultaneously struggling with the pressure of developing their 
own societal, political, military and economic personalities as well as combating the pressure of 
extra-regional involvement and the proxy wars that developed as a result.   
During the Cold War “international relations came to be rigidly defined by a small number of 
regional arrangements”22 and various defence alliance groupings, namely NATO, SEATO, ANZUS and 
the Warsaw Pact, typically characterised regional level security interactions and functioned under 
the shared auspices of collective defence. The post-Cold War period, by contrast, has seen the 
pursuit of state security evolve beyond these mechanisms and it has now sought to embrace the 
concepts of cooperative and comprehensive security. Subsequently the international system has 
experienced a growth in multilateral institution building in which new governmental, military and 
non-governmental mechanisms have emerged as a means of facilitating security dialogue. The 
significance of this shifting paradigm is that security coordination between states is no longer 
considered an act of defence but involves cooperation to securitize threats via mechanisms that do 
not involve force. This idea embodies the Deutschian concept of a security community, whereby 
armed conflict between states is accepted to be completely unthinkable and where social problems 
can (and must) be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change.’23 
As already noted, another distinct feature of the emerging international system24 is that the region, 
as a basis for group organisation, has become highly significant: “to a substantial extent, all regions 
in the post-Cold War period have moved towards inclusive regional arrangements.”25 Actors within 
their respective regions have become acutely aware of the fact that their security is intertwined 
within their own historical and geographical context and that the pursuit of national security cannot 
be achieved in the absence of considering the wider security environment. Security interdependence 
and the transnational nature of contemporary security threats has ensured that regions and their 
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preeminent regional organisations now have sought, in their own context and on their own terms, to 
manage their security affairs more closely with their neighbours . 
Arguably the end of the Cold War has marked one of the most significant shifts in the analysis of 
security in the international system and represents a “remarkable turning point in the international 
relations of regions and the role of regional security arrangements.”26 This period has seen two key 
changes that have facilitated the rise of regional cooperation as a means of coping with the reality of 
security interdependence. Firstly, the importance of the individual as a referent object of security 
has increased and the security agenda has broadened to include non-traditional security concerns 
such as human rights issues, international crime, economic security and poverty, environmental 
degradation, and demographic challenges. Secondly, there has been a shift away from the belief that 
dealing with security challenges can be met in a unilateral manner. Instead, there is a significant 
focus on security processes that seek to increase cooperation and reduce competition and conflict 
between neighbours by promoting trust building and transparency at the regional level. The task of 
ensuring that a secure and stable environment exists for all is no longer a preoccupation reserved 
just for governments, nor is it one that can be successfully achieved by a state alone. In the post-
Cold War era the regional level has emerged as the best possible means of organising multilateral 
cooperation and, arguably, regional peace and stability can only be attained on the basis of inclusion 
and engagement.27  
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Chapter Three – Regional Security Complex Theory 
 
Traditional International Relations theory holds that the global system is comprised of individual 
units that all possess the same power to affect systemic dynamics – it is for this reason that anarchy 
defines the relation among the units and that war is an ever present reality. However this is no 
longer strictly the case and, since World War Two, an array of multilateral institutions have emerged 
and sought to reject the Clauswitzian notion that war is a continuation of politics. The underlying 
aim of these organisations has been the collaborative pursuit of rendering war an unapetizing 
mechanism for action within the international system. Furthermore, a significant trend in the 
development of multilateral and intergovernmental groupings over the past five decades is that they 
have been initiated and conceptualised at a regional level. 
 
Security interdependence is more intense on a regional scale than it is on a global scale. This is 
grounded in the fact that the majority of the world’s 193 sovereign states28 generally lack the ability 
to project power much beyond their own regional sphere. It is for this reason that the regional level, 
as a distinct level of analysis between the national and international level, has become progressively 
significant and has emerged as one of the key perspectives through which to view the post-Cold War 
security environment. The importance of theorising about the regional level “is made necessary by 
the argument that regions are not just micro-versions of the global system”29 but that these two 
levels are innately different and incorporate their own dynamics.  Regions are not strictly “natural, 
objective and ontologically given spaces... Instead, regions are spatial and temporal constructs 
contingent on a variety of interests and agendas.”30 The regional level is bound within a historical 
and geographical context and thus the elements of proximity and familiarity intensify the nature of 
interactions between actors within regional groupings. While the materialist elements of defining 
regional parameters are crucial, this does not mean that the region is necessarily fixed as a 
permanent subsystem. It is important to note that regions are not impermeable and, unlike the 
global-level system which is inherently closed, the regional system can change as “even regions that 
seem most natural and inalterable are products of political reconstruction and subject to 
reconstruction attempts.”31 
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3.1 The Relevance of the Regional Level 
The regional level of security has become increasingly autonomous based on two foundational 
assumptions; first, that territoriality is still a ”central feature of international security dynamics”32 
and, second, that in the post-Cold War era the regional level is a necessary feature of any coherent 
analysis of international security. The latter may be illustrated by the rise of multilateral institutions 
in regional settings - as regionalism has become an increasingly popular means of organising 
comprehensive security mechanisms for many actors. As noted previously, and as the logic that links 
the previous two assumptions, “most types of threats travel more easily over short distances than 
long ones.”33 Consequently, regionally coherent security subsystems “stem from the simple 
mechanism... by which threats, particularly political and military ones, are most strongly felt when 
they are at close range.”34 As a result, certain security threats tend to be regionally localized and 
become so intertwined that they cannot, for the most part, be wholly resolved or analysed in the 
absence of considering the other units that exist within the dynamic of the complex. It is for this 
reason that “the central idea remains that substantial parts of the securitisation and desecuritisation 
processes in the international system will manifest themselves in regional clusters”35 and that these 
clusters are both durable and distinct from global level processes. This reality has facilitated the 
acknowledgement of security interdependence for many governments and has been the key driving 
force behind regional projects.  
3.2 Regional Security Complex Theory 
 
Over the past 50 years, and particularly during the Cold War, interest in regions as distinct features 
within international relations theory has fluctuated and has predominantly been focused on 
regionalism and the conceptualisation of regions as imagined communities. Regionalism has 
emerged as a focal point for constructivists in the development of a ‘new world order’ and has 
dominated regional analysis with its belief in regional groupings being bound together by shared 
identities, values and cultures.   
While a commonality of values and ideals may facilitate regional cooperation and the formation of 
multilateral organisations in their later stages, they are not adequate enough to fully explain the 
emergence of mutually exclusive regions and the intensity of dynamics within them. Mutual 
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interests exist irrespective of whether a sense of identity is shared by all. Materialist and rationalist 
features with territorial boundaries and power must also be acknowledged in order to wholly 
conceptualise regional formations in that, given the density of interactions and limited projection of 
power, regions are still territorially bounded and embedded within power distributions. Arguably, 
“all the states in the system are to some extent enmeshed in a global web of security 
interdependence. But because insecurity is often associated with proximity, this interdependence is 
far from uniform. Anarchy plus the distance effect plus geographical diversity yields a pattern of 
regionally-based clusters where security interdependence is markedly more intense between the 
states inside the complex and those outside it.”36 
Over the past decade, and based on his belief that regions are central to world politics, Barry Buzan 
has developed a conceptual framework for analysing the regional level as a standalone subsystem, 
one which incorporates characteristics that are distinct, durable and independent from global level 
phenomenon. Buzan offers what he has termed Regional Security Complex Theory and suggests 
that, in a world of mutually exclusive Regional Security Complexes, regional security complex theory 
(RSCT) can sharply distinguish between the regional and global levels.37 Regional Security Complexes 
exist throughout the international system and ”are defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity 
taking the form of subglobal, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence.”38 
Through RSCT Buzan suggests that the separation of the global and regional levels can be derived 
from something more realist and materialist than the constructivist idea of imagined political 
communities bound together by shared ideals and identities. 
 
First and foremost, the conceptualisation of Regional Security Complex Theory requires the 
clarification of several key definitions; namely, what is meant by the term ‘region’ and term 
‘security’. Here, the former represents a more problematic area than the latter, for the reasons 
above – i.e the conflict between constructivist and identification definitions of regions and realist 
and materialistic definitions. 
3.3 Defining Security 
As noted earlier, the concept of security has evolved and moved beyond its traditional roots of being 
strictly a value of the military or political sphere. To pursue the development of a strong and secure 
state, the state alone can no longer be treated as the sole referent object of security . In order to 
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highlight this evolution, Buzan offers a reconceptualised definition of security. He argues that a 
security threat is an issue that ”is posited (by a securitising actors) as a threat to the survival of some 
referent object (nation, state, the liberal internal economic order, the rain forests), which is claimed 
to have a right to survive. Since a question of survival necessarily involves a point of no return at 
which it will be too late to act, it is not defensible to leave the issue to normal politics.”39  
 
This reconceptualised definition of security highlights the element of perception, whereby security 
threats must be percieved as such in order to facilitate whether it is necessary to act or not to act 
and thus, from this point two further definitions are offered; securitisation and desecuritisation. 
1. Securitisiation is defined as  ”the discursive process through which an intersubjective 
understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an 
existential threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional 
measures to deal with the threat.”40 Essentially the idea of securitisation highlights the 
process by which a threat is treated equally by all involved as being a mutual and imminent 
concern that requires action. In regards to regional securitisation this requires that all actors 
view the issue, to the same extent, to be harmful to the referent object being threatened. 
This may be contrasted to the previous concept of security in which the actors who decided 
which threats were most dire were solely from within the state – as the state was acting as 
one unit within the international system and one unit alone.   
2. Desecuritisation is defined as ”the discursive process by which a political community 
downgrades or ceases to treat something as a threat.”41 By contrast, desecuritisation is the 
process by which those involved acknowledge that the threat is no longer an imminent 
reality and that it is an issue that can be dealt with within the ordinary framework of day to 
day politics. 
 
3.4 Defining ‘Region’ 
Defining a region is not a simple task and consequently no such definition exists that is going to 
satisfy all perspectives and theoretical needs. In order to understand how Buzan uses the term 
within his framework and in reference to RSCT it is important to offer his concept of the term.42 A 
region, in security terms, “means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists 
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among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with 
each other.”43  
 As argued by Buzan not only is geography a concrete situation for each state, “but, because its 
influence on processes of (de)securitisation, that it also cuts the world into distinct chunks so that 
the actors in a given region share the properties of their region as a structural context.” Combating 
piracy, for example, provides a case in point. Securitizing the freedom of movement within shipping 
lanes is an imminent concern for various regions, but, a non-existent one for others. Geography in 
this instance is a crucial factor and cannot be removed from this equation.  
3.5 Defining ‘Regional Security Complex’ 
A Regional Security Complex (as coined and conceptualised by Buzan) may be defined as a “set of 
units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization or both are so interlinked that their 
security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved from one another.”44  
 Buzan argues that within the framework of RSCT, “regions are not given by geography or culture or 
patterns of current events, or the whims of analysts, local discourses about regionalism. RSCs are 
socially constructed by their members, whether consciously or unconsciously by the ways in which 
their processes of (de)securitisation interlock with each other.”45 And thus, while RSCs may be 
durable, they are not permanent – “they can therefore be changed by changes in those processes 
though the scope for change may well be conditioned by the relative depth or shallowness of the 
way in which the social structure of security is internalised by the actors involved.”46 
3.5.1 The Conceptualisation of a Regional Security Complex 
Region building has been a slow and steady process in the works since World War Two. However, 
the impact of Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union had an intense 
impact of this process. The ability of these to states to project power and interfere in the dynamics 
of other states essentially froze regional developments in various areas as it temporarily suspended 
the emergence of many local dynamics. It was not until the 1990s that the structural configuration of 
the world began to emerge along regional lines and further facilitated by the acceleration of 
regionalisation, regionalism and the “advent of non-miltary actors.”47 In short, regional dynamics 
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began to characterise the relations of states in the international system more so than global 
dynamics. 
Regional security complexes are “ultimately defined by the interaction among their units... the 
pattern formed by these acts defines the RSC. If it were purely a product of global processes, it 
would obviously not be a regional level phenomenon.”48 It is for this reason that it is important to 
analyse the regional level as a distinct level and to not just a micro-level of global dynamics. 
While the concept of RSCs represent a fresh perspective within international relations, the concept 
has already evolved to better match the evolution of the contemporary security environment itself, 
whereby “traditionally, RSCs were usually generated by bottom-up (or inside out) processes which 
the fears and concerns generated within the region produced RSC.”49 However, given the realities of 
‘new’ and emerging security threats50 “regions can be created as patterns within system level 
processes”51 The example offered here is that “a group of countries find themselves sharing the local 
effects of a climate change is a case of collective responses to shared fates arising from outside 
systemic pressures.”52 While the systemic nature of the threat may make it appear as a global 
system threat, “the RSC is still constituted by the regional actors because they are the ones defining 
the problem in such terms and interacting to produce a regional formation over the issue.”53 As will 
be focused on in the next chapter, this feature is particularly important when considering the South 
Pacific complex – previously the region did represent an unstructured one in that the sparse 
geographical nature, the economic underdevelopment and socio-political instability of the region’s 
nation-states rendered the concerns of most to be strongly internal. It has been the introduction of 
‘new’ security threats that has drawn the states of the Pacific region together in a cooperative 
pursuit of regional security – climate change, resource exploitation and transnational crime, for 
example, represent some of the security objectives that Pacific Island countries have sought to 
securitize and have recognised as mutually concerning threats. 
3.6 The Essential Structure 
The essential structure of a RSC consists of four elements; boundary, anarchic structure, polarity and 
social construction. It is the combination of these four elements that differentiates the lines of the 
complex and may be characterised as follows:  
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3.6.1 BOUNDARY - Is there a clear boundary that may differentiate the members of one complex 
from another? 
As argued by Buzan and Waever, a RSC encapsulates a distinct dynamic between a particular set of 
states within a geopolitical context. The existence of a RSC is highlighted by a clear distinction 
between those units within the complex and those outside of it. As a result, the relationship 
between the states within the complex is intensified by elements of familiarity and proximity. Thus, 
it is important that a clear boundary exists and “that the local factors are given their proper weight 
in security analysis.”54 
3.6.2 ANARCHIC STRUCTURE - Are there two or more autonomous units within the complex? 
The structural variable of anarchy is clear and straightforward. In order for a regional subsystem with 
a clear boundary to emerge it is imperative that the majority of its units are autonomous. In the 
absence of such autonomy a distinct regional dynamic fails to emerge as the region is easily 
penetrated and influenced by outside powers.  
 3.6.3 POLARITY - Is there a distribution of power among units? 
As posited by Buzan and Waever, “the structure of anarchy, the essential structure and character of 
RSCs are defined by two kinds of relations, power relations and patterns of amity and enmity.”55 A 
RSC represents a substructure of the international system, and in a similar fashion, incorporates a 
distinct dynamic whose security can be either facilitated or hindered by the distribution of power 
within in. The regional level “can be analysed in terms of polarity, ranging from unipolar, through bi 
– and tripolar, to multipolar”56 and it is important that it is distinguished from global level polarity. 
The historical interactions between states is important and “it is thus not enough to look at the 
distribution of power in order to predict patterns of conflict....Historical hatreds and friendships, as 
well as specific issues trigger conflict or cooperation, and take part in the formation of an overall 
security constellation of fears, threats, and friendships that define a RSC.”57 
According to Buzan, ”the basic premise that security interdependence tends to be regionally focused 
is strongly mediated by the power of the units concerned,”58 whereby, the most imminent and 
critical security concerns have a tendency to be clustered on a regional scale. It is important to note 
that the role of great powers within this logic represents an abnormality as these powers have the 
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capacity to “largely transcend the logic of geography and adjacency in their security relationships, 
[whereas] at the other end of the power spectrum are those states whose limited capabilities largely 
confine their security interests and activities to their near neighbours.”59 
3.6.5 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION - Are there patterns of amity and enmity? 
Patterns of amity and enmity are much less a part of traditional IR theory than power, but rather 
represent an element that has emerged as a product of the density of regional interactions. These 
patterns highlight the interactions between states within the specified regional context and place 
the nature of these interactions on a spectrum between amity and enmity. These patterns tend to 
show what sort of relations has largely dominated the system – be it friend, rival or enemy – and are 
“influenced by various background factors such as history, culture, religion, geography, but to a large 
extent they are both path dependent and this become their own best explanation.”60 Power, while 
still necessary, is not sufficient as an indication of a regionally coherent subsystem. Whilst the 
distribution of power within a security complex does contribute to shaping the possibilities for 
alignment; it does not, however, shape the entire character of the region.61 
3.7 Summary  
RSCT argues that the essential structure of a RSC can be derived from four key variables; boundary, 
anarchy, polarity and social construction. Furthermore, that characterising the parameters of a RSC 
allows one to identify where the complex sits on the spectrum from conflict formation, through to 
security regime or security community and what this may explain about the regional dynamic itself. 
The merit of RSCT, as Buzan suggests, is that it “stays more narrowly with security and security-
defined activities, and uses RSCT as a general instrument for telling a structured version of world 
history, past, present and future.”62 The strength of RSCT rests the fact that it is “allowed to define 
the possible orders on the outcome side and to select the relevant parameters on the input side,”63 
which, in turn, rids the analysis of loose, ad hoc variables and, thereby, show both its virtues and its 
limitations. 
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Chapter Four - Southeast Asia and Regional Security Complex Theory 
4.1 The History and Conceptualisation of Southeast Asia 
As the largest continent in the world, Asia can be further divided into three sub-regions: “Northeast 
Asia (the People’s Republic of China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and the Russian Far 
East), Southeast Asia (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), and South Asia (India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka).”64 Having undergone a substantial transformation since the end of 
World War Two, the parameters of Southeast Asia as a geopolitical region are commonly derived 
from the ten member states that comprise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
ASEAN was founded in 1967 upon the signing of the Bangkok Declaration and sought to establish a 
regional partnership between its five founding members; Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines. ASEAN welcomed the addition of Brunei Darussalam upon full independence 
from the United Kingdom in 198465 and further continued to expand its membership base during the 
1990s. With the accession of Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and finally Cambodia in 
1999, the membership base of ASEAN, as an institution, managed to fully encapsulate Southeast Asia 
as a geopolitical region. ASEAN represents the heart of Southeast Asia and Southeast Asian 
regionalism where all, with the exception of the region’s newest nation state Timor-Leste,66 enjoy 
full and active participation in the region’s core multilateral organisation.  
Southeast Asia itself is comprised of two distinct subregions; the Malay Archipelago represents 
maritime Southeast Asia and landlocked Indochina represents the region’s mainland core. Each sub-
region is distinctive in that different patterns of interstate relations dominate the security dynamic.  
Indochina includes Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the northern peninsular of 
Malaysia. Interstate conflict within Indochina has been particularly problematic and the “Thai-
Vietnamese struggle for domination over Laos and Cambodia”67 has been one of its most defining 
characteristics. The Malay Archipelago includes the remainder of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Brunei, the Philippines and Timor-Leste. Rivalry and competition between Malaysia-Singapore-
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Indonesia is the core of the sub-regional dynamic and the desire to stabilise ties between the three 
states was a significant driving force behind the creation of ASEAN.68 Since the end of the Cold War 
interstate conflict in Southeast Asia has steadily declined. Historical grievances have been pushed 
aside and a fresh, geographically coherent form of regionalism has emerged. Southeast Asia’s 
regional security architecture has expanded significantly since 1967 and the region’s extensive 
institutional framework has come to define Southeast Asia as a region. Nonetheless, and despite 
shifting dynamics in the international security environment and the region itself, it is important to 
note that “old-fashioned concerns about power still dominate the security agendas of most regional 
powers, and war remains a distinct, if constrained, reality.”69  
Southeast Asia is an eclectic region with a wealth of cultural, social and political diversity. Extra-
regional interactions date back to the sixteenth century and the vibrancy and diversity of Southeast 
Asia is a direct reflection of the region’s geographical position in the heart of the trading route 
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Southeast Asia is highly syncretic and “noted more for its 
ethnic, religious and political heterogeneity than its homogeneity.”70 Each country within the region 
displays a variegated mixture of religious influences including Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, 
Hinduism, and animism. Religion plays a critical role in the culture of the region, yet the 
incorporation of religion into the identity of the region’s post-colonial nation-states has taken on 
different forms and has been a source of both stability and instability. With a population of 
242,968,342 million, 86 per cent71 of which are Muslim, Indonesia represents the country with the 
largest Muslim population in the world, yet Indonesia is not an Islamic state and has sought to define 
itself as both secular and democratic. Conversely, despite having a smaller Muslim percentage of 
60.4 per cent,72 Malaysia is defined as a Muslim state and Islam remains its official religion. 
From the mid-nineteenth century East Asia became dominated by foreign presence and Southeast 
Asia in particular suffered from the effects of colonization followed by the impact of World War Two. 
Post-colonial Southeast Asia “emerged in a protracted and often conflictual process of 
decolonisation.” 73 The beginning of post-colonialism and the emergence of the region’s new nation-
states began when “the Philippines gained independence in 1946, Burma in 1948, Indonesia in 1949, 
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Cambodia in 1953, Laos and Vietnam (in two parts) in 1954, Malaya in 1957 (wider Malaysia in 1963) 
and Singapore in 1965.”74 However, these events cannot be truly seen as the beginning of an 
independent and autonomous region. Within years of independence, “the Cold War divided the area 
into antagonistic communist and anti-communist alliance systems centred on the Soviet Union and 
the United States.”75 It was amidst the external pressure of the Cold War environment that the 
conflictual process of state formation began and the new, emerging Asian nation-states of Southeast 
Asia sought to develop a sense of individual autonomy and a sense of self within regional and 
international affairs. 
The effects of overlay and the pressure embedded within the Cold War context were especially 
harsh on Southeast Asia. For the length of the Cold War the region was at the mercy of the bipolar 
alignment of the international system and the balance-of-power politics of the Soviet Union and the 
United States. Consequently when the Cold War came to a close, and the region lost its strategic 
relevance, the units within the region were forced to confront their local security dynamics in a way 
that had not been experienced before. The reality of a weakened superpower presence left “more 
room for local security dynamics to take their own shape and to operate more on the basis of local 
resources, issues, and perceptions.”76 Relationships and rivalries within the regional context took a 
central position and the significance of proximity and familiarity in the perception of security threats 
emerged to define much of the security environment. 
The end of the Cold War culminated in the release of Southeast Asia from the effects of overlay. 
Although the beginnings of a regional security regime had already begun to take shape, the end of 
the Cold War meant that both anti-colonialism and non-aligned neutrality no longer maintained 
their central significance and thus took a back seat to the region’s own locally driven security 
environment. Post-overlay, the region took on a desecuritized form and continued to develop 
patterns of dialogue and mutual trust building that were already embedded with the foundation of 
ASEAN. Desecuritization in Third World regions was not a globally uniform response to the end of 
the Cold War and Southeast Asia was a unique case. The geopolitical context and historical legacy 
embedded within the regional level security environment became paramount and during this period 
each region took on a vastly different shape. In Southeast Asia, desecuritization took place as the 
regional structure started to slowly build an organisational framework as a means of coping with 
previously conflictual interstate relations and the fundamentals of a security regime began to 
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develop. By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa was also facing a decolonisation process and suffered 
significantly from high levels of local insecurity. Unlike Southeast Asia, the leaders in Sub-Saharan 
Africa did not have the capacity to form the cooperative mechanisms required to deal with their 
disputes and armed conflict became the status quo.77 Southeast Asia’s capacity to internally 
transform rests with the fact that economic prosperity ostensibly offered an incentive for states to 
cooperate. In sum, “rapid economic development helped sustain remarkable strategic stability on 
the surface”78 and resulted in the rapprochement of ties between previously hostile neighbours.  
4.2 The Southeast Asian Regional Security Complex 
The first traces of a Southeast Asian regional security complex manifested amidst the Cold War 
environment. However, its presence was subdued and heavily shaped around Cold War allegiances. 
During this time a sub-regionally coherent dynamic did emerge and “although Southeast Asia, like 
the other new third world RSCs, contained a wealth of interstate conflicts and rivalries, these 
dominated neither its operation nor its formation.”79 Progress towards interstate cooperation during 
ASEAN’s formative years was steady but incremental. So as to ensure that the ASEAN survived, 
ASEAN members found themselves preoccupied with the need to consolidate the new Association 
and overcome “the mutual suspicions and animosities that had bedevilled relations among its 
members.”80 In effect, ASEAN member states “managed to shelve the disputes among themselves, 
effectively forming a weak subregional security regime whose members agreed not to pursue their 
disagreements by force.”81 The intertwined nature of the regional security environment became an 
increasing reality and member states were forced to acknowledge that these interdependencies 
could not be managed in the absence of coordinated action. Despite historic patterns of conflict and 
rivalry, the ASEAN states found that as a collective they could provide their own “legitimacy, local 
knowledge and experience, and some resources”82 to the pursuit of stability and security within the 
region and, furthermore, could do so without the overbearing influence of extra-regional powers.  
The regional bipolarisation of conflict in Southeast Asia was largely shaped by the international 
system. However, “woven through this were substantial elements of still active regional level 
securitisation”83 and the beginnings of a web of security interdependence which would go on to 
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define the Southeast Asian security complex. The RSC of Southeast Asia has developed its own 
pattern of security relations and its own coping mechanisms. It is territorially bounded with an 
element of social construction and contains its own distinct distribution of power and regionally 
driven patterns of amity and enmity. As a result, Southeast Asia has steadily developed a regional 
security architecture in which the facilitation of stability and security at the regional level has been 
the ultimate goal. The pursuit of security in the post-colonial history of the region, however, has not 
been without its obstacles, which have both come to define and disrupt the Southeast Asian security 
complex and its coping strategies. 
The Essential Structure of the Southeast Asian RSC 
4.3 BOUNDARY - Is there something differentiating a RSC from its neighbours? 
The boundary of Southeast Asia’s regional security complex is commonly associated with the 
parameters of ASEAN membership which significantly since its expansion in the 1990s and with the 
exception of Timor-Leste’s lack of full membership, has regarded itself as an accurate reflection of 
geographical Southeast Asia.84 East Asia itself has three distinct sub-regions with separate dynamics 
that drive their own regional security complexes but also play into the wider regional dynamic.  
Varied historical relationships and distributions in power have resulted in individual complexes that 
function autonomously and independently from those experienced in other parts of Asia. Northeast 
Asia comprises two great powers (China and Japan), both of which receive either positive or 
negative attention from the United States. South Asia contains India, an important and aspiring state 
that is seeking to compete with China and is South Asia’s “leading aspirant to elevation from regional 
to great power standing.”85 Southeast Asia by contrast is the only Asian sub-region that “contains no 
Great Powers with global reach.”86 While it may incorporate regional powers, such as Indonesia, no 
state has the capacity to project power beyond its regional sphere. As a result the boundary of the 
Southeast Asian complex has become important in driving the terms and the means by which the 
region copes with, and socialises, the larger powers within the wider regional context.  
The view of Southeast Asia as a stand alone region became popularized during the Cold War “albeit 
one with only shadowy unity and indistinct borders.”87 The formation of ASEAN has played a strong 
role in conceptualising the existence of Southeast Asia as an autonomous region and as a result 
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geographical coherency has always remained critical.88 The engagement of outside powers has 
always been achieved via offshoot forums and by socialising extra-regional states in such a manner 
that ASEAN has managed to maintain its geographical integrity while allowing for Southeast Asian 
preferences to determine the terms and conditions upon which outside powers engage.89 In spite of 
their economic and political weaknesses, the expansion of ASEAN’s membership base to incorporate 
Vietnam in 1995,90 Laos and Myanmar in 1997,91 and Cambodia in 199992 highlighted the desire for 
ASEAN to fully reflect the geographic region as a whole. The idea of geographic coherency was 
further reiterated in the introduction to the ASEAN Charter in 2007 in which explicit reference was 
made to ASEAN membership being derived from “location in the recognised geographic region of 
Southeast Asia.”93 On this basis, and irrespective of concerns over internal political stability, states 
such as Myanmar cannot be expelled from the Association for failing to comply with political 
norms.94 
The territorial boundary between the individual security complexes of Southeast Asia, South Asia 
and Northeast Asia, have developed organically and within their own historical context each 
complex has become defined by its own unique structure, polarity and patterns of interaction. 
Standing back to back between complexes, Myanmar has been typically regarded as the insulator 
state between the three. Particularly during the Cold War, and as a result of the military regime’s 
post-colonial isolationist policy, Myanmar emerged as a zone of indifference “between the self-
contained dynamics on either side,”95 yet, did not have the strength to unify them into one. It has 
been the vast geographical space to the south of Southeast Asia that has left the conceptualisation 
of the region with a few points of contention. Southeast Asia rests at the centre of the loosely 
conceptualised Asia-Pacific area , a term generally used to refer to the wider East Asian region in 
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addition to portions of Oceania; namely New Zealand, Australia and Papua New Guinea. The security 
of the additional Oceanic states does experience elements of interdependency with the Southeast 
Asian security environment: Papua New Guinea suffers from the unrest in Indonesia’s southern 
provinces; Australia has had significant trouble managing the illegal flow of immigrants and the 
trafficking of drugs from its northern neighbours; and the major political unrest in the former 
Indonesian province of Timor-Leste has resulted in New Zealand and Australia’s largest contribution 
to international security and peacekeeping since the Korean War.96  In spite of overlapping security 
concerns, “it was notable in defining the regional boundary between Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific that neither Australia and New Zealand nor Papua New Guinea (which gained independence 
in 1975) joined ASEAN.”97 The Asia-Pacific is still a loosely constructed region and while Australia, 
New Zealand and Papua New Guinea have all sought strongly to engage in the security framework of 
the Southeast Asian complex they have done so through regional offshoots such as the ARF and EAS.  
4.4 ANARCHIC STRUCTURE – Are there one or more units? 
The anarchic structure of the international system has been one of its most enduring features 
throughout history. It is the existence of such anarchy, in combination with the limitations of 
geography, which is responsible for the creation of regionally driven security complexes. 
Furthermore, it is the presence of regionalism that highlights the existence of anarchy and the need 
to mitigate its effects in the pursuit of regional prosperity. In essence, the political structure of 
anarchy “confronts all states with the security dilemma, but the otherwise seamless web of security 
interdependence is powerfully mediated by the effects of geography.”98 The interdependent, but 
anarchical, structure of the units that comprise Southeast Asia is a case in point. The Southeast Asian 
dynamic exhibits a strong and conflictual push-and-pull between the individuality of its units and 
their own desire for self-preservation, and the extent to which self-preservation cannot be achieved 
in the absence of collective action as an economic and political regional bloc. 
The anarchic structure of the units that comprise Southeast Asia has consistently been one of its 
definitive features; both in conflict and cooperation. Interstate conflict in the region reached its peak 
in the 1960s and 1970s as the remnants of pre-colonial political structures took hold and historical 
securitizations between neighbours reignited interstate disputes.99 The pursuit of nationalistic self-
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preservation dominated conflict between neighbours and insecurity across the region became 
widespread: “Thailand and (North) Vietnam drifted into rivalry in Cambodia and Laos, and Cambodia 
resisted Vietnamese hegemonism. Between 1963 and 1966 Indonesia threatened to extinguish the 
new Malaysian federation, and had frictions with Singapore. There was also a territorial dispute 
between Malaysia and the Philippines over claims to Sabah.”100 It was not until 1965 when a change 
of government took place in Indonesia101 that the dissolution of the region’s conflict formation 
began to take shape in the maritime core of Southeast Asia and the rapprochement of ties between 
Malaysia-Indonesia-Singapore paved the way for a weak security regime.  The growing 
consciousness of security interdependence ensured that the anarchical regional structure did not 
continue to descend into a typical post-colonial conflict formation and that “rather than sharpening 
their national identities against each other, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
Thailand... began to construct a subregional security regime.”102 However, institution building after 
1967 remained concentrated within maritime Southeast Asia and the structure of mainland 
Southeast Asia continued to be dominated by Vietnam’s hegemonic aspirations and the ongoing 
effects of the Cold War. The ideological division of the region into communist and non-communist 
allegiances further ensured that the Indochinese subregion remained alienated from the emerging 
security regime. It was not until 1989, when Vietnam’s decade long occupation of neighbouring 
Cambodia came to an end, that the anarchic structure of the region began to encapsulate all of 
geographic Southeast Asia and became characterised by a burgeoning security regime comprised of 
autonomous and nationalistic individual units.  
4.5 POLARITY - Is there a distinct distribution of power amongst the units? 
 The dynamics of power and balance-of-power theory have largely been used to explain the actions 
of autonomous states and their pursuit of security within the international system. As a contested 
notion, balance-of-power refers roughly to the “equal distribution of power existing between two or 
more states”103 and may be viewed in one of two ways. Balance-of-power can describe a state of 
equilibrium as a condition of the environment in and of itself or, alternatively, can refer to the action 
of creating policy in the aim of attaining a state of balance.104 The history of Southeast Asia, prior to 
the beginning of decolonisation in the mid-1940s, reveals little about the power dynamics of the 
regional level as all, with the exception of Thailand, suffered from the impact of colonial control. By 
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1975 the process of post-colonial state-formation had well and truly ensued in a majority of the 
region105 and many new nation-states had begun to take shape. The formation of ASEAN facilitated 
in rebuilding the relationship between Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia and paved the way for 
regionally specific balancing behaviour to emerge that was not antagonistic and driven by military 
acquisitions. Indochina continued to contribute little to the regional level balance-of-power and was 
heavily overwhelmed by the system level power dynamics. By 1975, communist victories in 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam had occurred,106 although this did not immediately alter the overall 
regional balance as no counteracting balance-of-power military structures materialized as a reaction 
from non-communist Southeast Asia. However, and at the subregional level, Vietnam’s unification 
did instigate balance-of-power behaviour from Cambodia and Thailand in reaction to Vietnam’s 
burgeoning hegemonic aspirations.  The system level continued to subdue the contribution of 
Indochina to overall regional level polarity and balancing relations between both communist and 
non-communist Southeast Asian states, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China remained the 
ultimate focus.   
During the Cold War, local level conflict in Southeast Asia remained bipolarised and was organised 
on the basis of communist and anti-communist alliance systems. The end of the Cold War “opened 
the way for ASEAN to unite the sub-region in a security regime based on Westphalian principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention”107 and rejected the idea that regional security and balance could 
only be attained via a military alliance system. For the first time in the post-colonial era the regional 
level defined the balancing behaviour of its units and Southeast Asian polarity drew from local 
perceptions, resources and issues from within its own geopolitical context. Nonetheless, and whilst 
multilateralism in Southeast Asia may have diluted the overt balancing behaviour of its units, 
“ASEAN has not completely rejected balance of power behaviour. Some developments – for 
example, patterns of arms modernization, Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN, and *the then+ 
suspended Australia-Indonesia security agreement – could also be view as balance of power 
policies.”108 
The 1990s marked a critical and testing time for the regional framework as ASEAN endeavoured to 
both deepen and broaden its scope politically and economically. The expansion of ASEAN to include 
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the region’s mainland and former communist states demanded a readjustment of regional balance. 
The end of the great power struggle in Indochina altered the previously acute division between the 
ASEAN group and Vietnam. Regional unification had to look beyond ASEAN’s uncharacteristically 
open condemnation of Vietnam’s decade long occupation of Cambodia and reconciliation sought to 
synchronise Vietnam’s regional aspirations more coherently with those of ASEAN.109 Economically 
driven regionalism also flourished during this period as APEC110 began to gain momentum and with 
the introduction of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)111 in 1992. However, concerns over the 
distribution of wealth did weigh heavily on the region’s emerging economic institutions and the 
integration of new, but economically weaker, ASEAN members added further complexity to the 
pursuit of economic prosperity and regional stability. 
 Throughout the history of post-colonial Southeast Asia Indonesia has long endeavoured to be the 
dominant power within the region. During the initial conflict formation of Southeast Asia Indonesia’s 
power aspirations were readily apparent. Between 1963 and 1966 open confrontation between 
Indonesia and Malaysia became characterised by the Sukarno regime’s Konfrontasi policy,112 in 
which Indonesia’s desire to dominate the region and to break up the new federation amounted to 
both political and armed opposition.113 The collapse of the Sukarno regime in 1965 altered 
Indonesia’s traditionally antagonistic and power driven role within the region to one of open 
engagement and pragmatic cooperation. As a positive force Indonesia’s engagement became 
instrumental in the formation of ASEAN as well as providing APEC with a vehement supporter in the 
1980s. However, concerns of Indonesia’s domestic insecurity have also represented a destabilizing 
feature in the regional balance as Jakarta’s focus on internal affairs has not necessarily been 
congruent with those outlined at the regional level. The impact of internal disputes in Aceh, West 
Papua and East Timor have permeated the international level and have raised questions over 
ASEAN’s functionality and commitment to international values and on human rights.114 Indonesia 
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represents a large portion of the region – both in terms of geography and population. Comprising of 
over 17,000 islands the Indonesian archipelago is vast and fragmented and, as a result, cultural and 
religious influences throughout Indonesia’s provinces are not uniform and particular influences have 
been typically concentrated more so in some provincial areas than others.115 Volatile relations 
between provincial guerrillas and the Indonesian government in Jakarta116  have been a significant 
obstacle to the socio-political cohesion of the country and the balance that Indonesia provides as a 
leader at the regional level.  
4.5.1 Polarity and Extra-Regional Powers 
The security dynamic of Southeast Asia has been transformed dramatically in the post-colonial era. 
The intensity with which the fate of the region’s units have become heavily intertwined is reflected 
in the presence of ASEAN and the extent to which ASEAN represents a platform for broad based 
coordination between individual, albeit interdependent, units. The relative autonomy of the regional 
level has been one of Southeast Asia’s defining post-Cold War features and regional order has 
functioned on the simple notion that, more so than ever before, the solution to regional problems 
can be found at the regional level. This is not to say, however, that the international system is 
neither influential nor factored into the security dynamic. As the shape of the international system 
has transformed, so has ASEAN’s approach to the integration of extra-regional powers into the 
regional structure. Given the reality of varied bilateral and historical relationships between major 
extra-regional powers and individual Southeast Asian states, the process of engaging outside powers 
has not been easy and an ASEAN-wide consensus on the role of differing major powers has been 
difficult to achieve.  
One of the key features of ASEAN’s initial development was its determination to pull away from the 
region’s dependence on the United States and to neutralise its place within the global dynamic.117 In 
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the past the structure of Southeast Asia’s security environment reflected less of what its units 
represented to each other and more so what they represented as strategic pawns on the Cold War 
chessboard. From its inception ASEAN sought to facilitate a Southeast Asian region that was 
responsible for the polarity of its structure and through mutual trust and dialogue could build an 
autonomous and resilient region by accommodating modernizing changes without fear of sparking a 
security dilemma. Lastly, and by limiting the impact to the international system, the new world of 
emerging Asian states proposed that “a new geography free of colonial and Eurocentric biases and 
an objective understanding of non-Western people”118 could create a distinctly Asian form of 
regionalism that would be the most valuable tool in the pursuit of regional stability and security.  
4.6 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION - Are there patterns of amity and enmity? 
The early history of post-colonial Southeast Asia is marked by nationalistic rivalry and competition 
with significant conflict between several of the region’s major units. Conflict between Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore was particularly problematic during the decolonisation period. The disparity 
in size between the three, in addition to Jakarta’s desire to achieve regional dominance, resulted in 
significant patterns of enmity in the early formative stages of post-colonial maritime Southeast Asia. 
Interstate conflict in Indochina has also been pervasive and historically the sub-region has been 
dominated more by patterns of enmity than amity. Border disputes between Thailand and its 
neighbouring states,119 in addition to Vietnamese hegemony over Laos and Cambodia, have been the 
dominant features of the sub-regional dynamic and, in some cases, these disputes have eased but 
never dissolved completely. In the early post-colonial years, conflict in Southeast Asia was much akin 
to that of the security environment of the Middle East and had the potential to descend into a 
similar and fully fledged conflict formation. However, the impact of the “devastation wrought by 
Indonesia’s konfrontasi campaign against Malaysia (1963 – 1966) exposed the dangers of territorial 
revisionism and the need for common affirmation of postcolonial frontiers.”120  The establishment of 
ASEAN in 1967 and the commitment to a territorial status quo that became “enshrined in the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) concluded during the first ASEAN summit in Bali in 1976”121 assisted 
the region in taking on a desecuritized form and reducing the viability of military confrontation 
between individual states. The role of ASEAN became to socially construct an economic, political and 
social grouping that was both accommodating to individual differences but also reflected the 
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region’s shared security environment. Rather than seeking to overtly reduce conflict via a military 
alliance, the establishment of ASEAN aimed to construct a forum for cooperation and coordination 
that in turn would have the secondary effect of alleviating interstate conflict. The emerging reality of 
security interdependence ensured that it would be more costly for one unit to compromise overall 
regional stability in the pursuit of self-interest and that coordination could actually strengthen their 
nationalistic goals and, simultaneously, keep both their sovereignty and autonomy intact. With 
ASEAN as the organisational hub of the Southeast Asian security complex, Southeast Asia has been 
hailed as one of the most successful regional transformations from conflict formation to security 
regime. Yet, the existence of a security regime does not completely rule out conflict, “rather, conflict 
exists, but the actors agree to cooperate to deal with it.”122 The reality of interstate conflict is still 
very much real but restrained.123 
Changing patterns of enmity to amity between the units of Southeast Asia predates ASEAN’s 
Bangkok Declaration in 1967 and “the desire to avoid confrontation and acrimony in international 
relations and the importance of low-key, consensus-based diplomacy can be traced back to ASEAN’s 
predecessor, the short-lived Association of Southeast Asia (ASA).”124 Further organisational attempts 
in the form of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO)125 and MAPHILINDO (which 
combined Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) also predate ASEAN and emerged as 
representations of the region’s desire to strengthen the cooperation between its neighbouring units, 
albeit each with a different objective and membership base. Whilst both ASA and MAPHILINDO 
failed to create a sustainable basis for regional order, in some respect, they did sow the seeds for 
regional coordination. Although, and in order to achieve success, it was essential that ASEAN 
withheld from the rhetoric of the ASA and MAPHILINDO. The comparative survival and evolution of 
ASEAN largely rests with the fact that it was internally devised and was based upon a series of values 
and ideals that distinctly reflected the history, proximity and familiarity of the units within Southeast 
Asia. ASEAN was defined fully from within the region and on terms that resonated with how regional 
leaders believed they could function and cooperate successfully with each other in the pursuit of 
regional stability. Furthermore, the desire was for regional order to be attained and to function 
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independent of major power influence. ASEAN remains the region’s “first and still the most 
successful venture”126 and has embodied a uniquely Asian form of regionalism. 
The need for cooperation and coordination in the mitigation of both traditional and non-traditional 
security threats, which cannot be achieved independently, is the definitive variable underpinning 
amicable relations in Southeast Asia. It is the indivisible nature of security which has seen 
cooperative mechanisms emerge and it has been self-preservation, not altruism, that has become 
the key factor ensuring patterns of amity continue to dominate the regional dynamic. Security 
cooperation has predominantly involved bilateral exchanges in logistics, equipment, and intelligence 
in reaction to existential threats such as terrorism and piracy, but successful coordination has been 
mixed and has often failed to receive full commitment from all sides.    
The development of the ‘ASEAN way’ has played a fundamental role in facilitating amicable relations 
between neighbours and, as a style of diplomacy, has been used to dictate intra-ASEAN behaviour 
and habits of dialogue. It is the central principle of non-interference that “links together the 
concepts of comprehensive, cooperative, and common security”127 which, combined with 
consultation and consensus based decision-making, “creates the perception of public unity by not 
shaming another member.”128 Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity is enshrined in 
the ‘ASEAN way’ and aims to place confidence in the capability of individual governments to 
maintain domestic control over the physical base, idea and institutions of the state.129 Non-
interference in domestic affairs, however, “does not mean that ASEAN members are indifferent to 
one another, nor does it mean they never become involved in each other’s domestic affairs. It simply 
means that one elite supports another by not publicly criticizing the other and by providing support, 
both tangible and nontangible, if an elite is threatened by internal rebellion.”130 ASEAN’s respect for 
non-interference and silent support of its member states has been a complicated element within the 
regional style of diplomacy and has inhibited the mitigation of regional threats such as terrorism and 
been the cause of frustration in the international community.131 Shared beliefs on non-interference 
and territorial integrity, nonetheless, have remained critical elements in the rapprochement of ties 
between previously hostile neighbours and the maintenance of amicable relations.  
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4.6.1 Non-Interference and Internal Security 
Internal insecurity is a pervasive feature of the Southeast Asian security environment and a high 
degree of vulnerability to political internal threats is prominent throughout the region. Sources of 
individual political weakness include: an ethnic-religious insurgency in the South of Thailand; weak 
democratic practices in the Philippines; secessionist violence in the outer provinces of Indonesia and 
concerns about ruling parties in both Malaysia and Singapore. Internal conflict rarely remains 
internal and the reality of porous borders can contribute to flow of refugees into neighbouring 
countries which, in turn, can strain relations between states.132 In addition, the spill over effect can 
exacerbate the focus on the dispute and have an internationalizing impact. As the impact of internal 
conflict spreads, either physically by spilling over borders or by highlighting the inability of the 
regional framework to restrain conflict within and between its states, the potential for strained 
relations heightens, both at the regional and international level.133 
The complexity of dealing with internal conflict in the former Indonesian province of East Timor and 
integrating the internally weak state of Myanmar into the ASEAN fold represent two of the most 
testing incidents in the social construction of ASEAN: First, by highlighting the limits of ASEAN in 
coping with internal security concerns whose effects permeate both the regional and international 
level and, second, by signifying a social and spatial caveat in the conceptualisation of Southeast 
Asia.134 Historically, the cherished value of non-interference has benefited the ASEAN style of 
diplomacy by means of facilitating coordination without challenging claims of sovereignty and the 
territorial integrity of any of its members. However ongoing internal issues in Myanmar and violence 
in Timor-Leste135 received an international audience and placed external pressure on ASEAN to take 
a firmer stance on the unstable domestic politics of its member states. In both cases, ASEAN could 
not avoid taking an official stand on particular domestic security issues and faced criticism over its 
capacity to maintain regional order.  
                                                          
132 For example, as conflict ensued in the province of West Papua a mass exodus of refugees into Papua New 
Guinea took place. Inevitably, this strained relations between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Ian Bell, Herb 
Feith and Ron Hatley, ‘The West Papuan Challenge to Indonesian Authority in Irian Jaya: Old Problems, New 
Possibilities’, Asian Survey, 26, no. 5 (May, 1986), pp. 539-556. 
133
 Coping with the effects of internal conflict is a source of tension between individual ASEAN members as 
well as between ASEAN and the international community. The United Nations, for example, has previously 
questioned ASEAN over its capacity to ensure its member states adhere to universal principles regarding 
human rights.  
134
 Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Challenging ASEAN: A “Topological” View’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29, no. 3 
(2007), p. 428. 
135
 International attention was particularly prominent in 1999 and thus led to the introduction of an Australian-
led UN peace keeping force in order to end the violence and to ease East Timor’s transition to independence. 
Subsequently, Timor-Leste made international headlines again following riots in both 2002 and 2006. 
“Residents flee East Timor capital”, BBC News, 5 May 2006, [online] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/4975722.stm [accessed 17 October 2011]. 
33 
 
 Since independence in 2002, Timor-Leste has slowly gained momentum towards establishing itself 
as a functioning and autonomous state, although, and at the Timorese government’s request, 
“around 550 Australian and New Zealand military personnel remain on the ground... to help 
maintain security.”136 Although factional fighting reignited in 2006, killing dozens and leaving 
150,000 people homeless,137 the country has steadily re-stabilised and, like all new nation-states, 
Timor-Leste continues to face a myriad of developmental challenges as it lays the foundations for 
building a legitimate and viable state - politically, socially and economically. In spite of Timor-Leste’s 
historical, cultural and geographical relationship with Southeast Asia, the new-nation state 
represents a caveat in the conceptualisation of ASEAN encapsulating all of geographic Southeast 
Asia. The independence of Timor-Leste has raised complicated questions about the state’s 
integration into the regional security architecture of Southeast Asia and also the extent to which 
ASEAN has the capacity to cope with the implications of another membership expansion. Timor-
Leste is currently regarded as an ASEAN special observer and whilst full membership has been 
applied for, and despite the vast cost of establishing and maintaining full embassies throughout the 
region, Timor-Leste will need to meet all pre-requisites in order for full membership to be granted.   
The evolution of Southeast Asia and its expanding regional security architecture has seen the region 
transform from a conflict formation of new nation-states, to a small and nascent security regime 
and, in its current form, a geographically coherent security regime with relative autonomy over the 
regional security environment. However, and whilst a successful transformation has taken place, this 
is not to say regional patterns of amity are fixed and non-reversible. Military conflict remains a 
possible, if not subdued, reality. In spite of the idea gaining momentum from both within Southeast 
Asia138 and outside,139 the establishment of an ASEAN security community has not been achieved. 
ASEAN’s capacity to establish one cohesive and integrated regional community is still heavily 
debated and is a transformation process that could alter the essence of the institution itself, not only 
in terms of the integration of outside powers, but also the rules of engagement within the 
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institution. Instead of strictly non-binding values such as mutual respect and understanding 
governing the regional dynamics, this would see the introduction of legally binding laws and norms 
that would not only restrict the limits of power, but would also oblige member states to collectively 
act against a member state if they were to breach the framework of legal terms and conditions. 
Significantly, the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in December 2007 represents a fundamental and 
unprecedented step towards “a legal and institutional framework for the association,”140 the relative 
success of which, however, remains to be seen.   
4.6.2 Social Construction and Extra-Regional Powers. 
The strategic interaction and integration of major world powers into the regional security 
architecture is important to the social construction of the region and the extent to which extra-
regional engagement may be achieved without compromising the exclusive nature of ASEAN itself as 
the central regional institution. Extra-regional powers are essentially managed through their 
involvement in various offshoot initiatives, which are instigated by ASEAN and in which ASEAN 
centrality remains the driving organisational force. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) established in 
1994 and ASEAN+3 (APT) established in 1997141 in particular have been devised as a means of 
engaging particular powers, but on the terms and conditions outlined by ASEAN. Furthermore, the 
region’s security architecture has continued to grow in order to cope with shifting patterns in major 
power relations which are taking shape within Southeast Asia. In essence “ASEAN, for its part, sees 
the significance of its connection to the United States declining and is aware of the need to create a 
more coherent regional regime to deal with expanding Chinese power.”142  
The shape of the East Asia and what kind of relationships China develops with its neighbours is both 
politically and economically critical to the security dynamic of Southeast Asia. The roles of China and 
Japan as regional powers, and the United States as a world power, may underpin patterns of 
interaction in East Asia itself but, as is highlighted by China’s naval posturing and pursuit of territorial 
claims in the South China Sea,143 the potential for East Asian balancing behaviour to impinge on the 
security dynamic of Southeast Asia is a constant reality. Furthermore, “how China relates to its East 
Asian region, and how the US and China relate to each other, are deeply intertwined issues which 
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centrally affect not only the future of East Asian, but also global, security”144 and the likelihood of 
Southeast Asia being the first to experience the effects of a global standoff are high and significant. 
Regionalism in Asia has been typically inward looking and “driven by historical patterns of 
cooperation, the common challenge of the west, the century-long quest for an Asian identity, and 
growing economic interdependence and integration.”145 However, the changing shape of the wider 
East Asian region has seen a series of dramatic shifts occur that are influencing regional power 
dynamics and creating new uncertainties.146 During the Cold War era American military strength and 
its network of bilateral alliances largely underpinned Southeast Asian regional stability.147 However, 
as the United States withdrew militarily from mainland Southeast Asia in 1973 and the strategic 
relevance of the region eventually dissolved with the collapse of the Cold War in 1989, American 
engagement in the region reached an all time low and the potential end of American predominance 
became signalled by the rise of China and India.148  Southeast Asia’s interregional relations with 
neighbouring complexes, as well as with the global powers, are becoming increasingly crucial and 
ASEAN itself is a part of a “bigger security picture, no longer confined just to Southeast Asia.”149 
4.6.3 Economic Security and the Asian Financial Crisis 
The economic dimension of regional security in Southeast Asia has been a facilitating factor in the 
rapprochement between states and positive patterns of interaction. The need for coordination in 
the pursuit of self-interest is imperative in regards to economic security and is a factor that has 
inadvertently ensured amicable relations among ASEAN member states. In spite of the massive 
economic impact of the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997150 and the following ‘Asian crisis’, the 
development of regionalism in Southeast Asia received a renewed boost as a result. Whilst the crisis 
began as a financial one it did not remain strictly economic for very long. The financial crisis became 
an economic issue; the economic instability penetrated the societal sector, which in turn then spilled 
over to the political realm.151 Essentially, “the economic and social fabrics of their societies were 
torn as bad loans, shaky financial system, corporate bankruptcies, rising unemployment and 
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plunging currencies suddenly engulfed them.”152 The advancement of regionalism in Asia remained 
relatively stagnant prior to the Asian financial crisis and the need to cohesively develop ASEAN’s 
regional framework was overshadowed by the dramatic rise of its emerging individual economies. 
The economic sector in this period took on a life of its own and “ASEAN came into international 
prominence primarily as a consequence of the high performance of its ‘tiger economies’ from 1987 
to 1997.”153 Consequently, the 1997 crisis had a dual effect on the dynamic of the region. The impact 
of the crisis permeated all sectors and spread throughout much of the wider region and whilst this 
created mass unrest and uncertainty throughout the Asia-Pacific, it also had the surprising impact of 
bolstering regional cooperation. It was the catalytic force of the Asian financial crisis that highlighted 
“the perceived heavy handedness of the United States and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)”154 and produced a deep and powerful “politics of resentment.”155 It was this deep resentment 
that facilitated the establishment of a more inwardly looking view of regionalism in Asia. 
The Asian financial crisis highlighted the inadequacy of the region’s economic framework and also 
the fact that neither the IMF nor the United States could support the region’s recovery to the extent 
that they had anticipated. The crisis reiterated ASEAN’s underpinning ethos that regional solutions 
needed to be found at the regional level and, as a result, “the idea of creating an institutional 
mechanism to promote East Asian cooperation consequently made a comeback.” 156 Established in 
1993, ASEAN + 3 (APT) was an institution which sought to increase economic relations between 
ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea. Whilst the APT gained some momentum in its formative 
years, it was not until the crisis hit that the importance of wider Asian cooperation really took effect. 
This new arrangement aimed to “work out currency swaps and other arrangements designed to 
forestall another economic meltdown and dilute the influence of the IMF.”157 Furthermore, and as a 
direct result of the crisis, “ASEAN has paid sedulous attention to promoting intra- and interregional 
growth, extending its economic processes into an East Asia Community.”158 The idea of extending 
the regional framework to that of wider, but still exclusive, “East Asian” regionalism has received 
strong Chinese support and has been “premised on the viability and normative preference for an 
Asia by and for “Asians” that is excluding the United States and Pacific Asia.”159 Beijing in particular 
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has strongly pushed for the “Asianization”160 of international relations in the region as this strategic 
move could potentially and gradually ease America and its influence out of the region.161   
In 2005, the construction of an East Asia regional framework began to gain momentum and the 
newly conceptualised “East Asian Community” became a popularized idea. The East Asian 
Community concept took a significant lean towards a community which was less exclusive than 
previous initiatives and “with the stroke of a summit, the conception of East Asia was suddenly 
stretched... as it stood, the EAS represented a remarkable qualification, a baffling revision, of the 
exclusive Asia principle that had been pursued since the Asian financial crisis.”162 The East Asian 
Summit (EAS) came into existence in 2005 and “included not only the APT members but also a set of 
three more states – India, Australia and New Zealand.”163  The EAS sought to encapsulate not only 
East Asia, but the more expansive Asia-Pacific area. The summit represented a hybrid of the ARF and 
APT and, it was hoped, would play a coordinating role in both economic and security regionalism. In 
2010, and of notable significance, the EAS formally expanded its membership base to include both 
the United States and Russia.164 On the one hand this move has been regarded as a positive step 
towards the re-engagement of the United States in Asia’s multilateral framework yet, on the other, it 
has also raised serious questions about the extent to which the membership of numerous and 
competing world powers will impact on, and potentially dilute, the institution’s functional capacity. 
Lastly, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an annual forum held to promote economic 
cooperation between the ‘economies’ of the Asia-Pacific. Unlike the majority of regional projects 
that have emerged from Southeast Asia’s regional framework, APEC is not an ASEAN initiative but, in 
part, still reflects an important element in the social construction of the region. Founded in 1989 
APEC aimed “ostensibly to stimulate economic cooperation across the Pacific rim, but again not 
without an oblique security agenda.”165 APEC was established to facilitate sustainable regional 
autonomy and ensure that regional economic stability could be derived from within the region and 
was not contingent upon outside influences. It is important to note that whilst the existence of APEC 
(as a regional project independent of ASEAN) has been useful to ASEAN, in the sense that it has 
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successfully served as an extensive forum for economic discussion across the Asia-Pacific that does 
not hold ASEAN necessarily accountable for its progress. It does, however, have the potential to 
undermine ASEAN at the same time. Unlike ASEAN’s direct organisational offshoots, ASEAN control 
over APEC is limited. However, in spite of this, what occurs within APEC impacts on ASEAN’s own 
wider regional framework, whereby “ASEAN had to struggle hard to maintain its leadership with an 
ARF containing several large powers, Japan and the United States wanted more influence for 
themselves, and could threaten to use APEC as an alternative forum.”166 
The development of the APT and the emergence of the EAS both represent beneficial steps towards 
the strengthening and potential expansion of the wider East Asian social construct.  Whilst the idea 
of East Asia constituting a ‘community’ in the true Deutschian sense is far from being achieved, the 
Asia-Pacific area has begun to take steps towards establishing “a comprehensive scope for regional 
cooperation which would include political-security and transnational issues.”167 In spite of this, 
however, it is important to note that the idea that “ASEAN remains an essentially state-sovereignty 
reinforcing organization becomes more evident when we explore the lack of intraregional economic 
integration, which is neither a peripheral nor recent focus of ASEAN concern or ASEAN 
commentary”168 and “ASEAN states continue to trade more with the rest of the world than they do 
with each other.”169 
4.7 Summary  
Regional security complex theory offers valuable insight into the understanding of Southeast Asia’s 
regional security environment and the evolution of its regional security architecture. The creation 
and survival of ASEAN has been instrumental to the transformation of the region’s essential 
structure and has been responsible for incrementally changing the face of post-colonial Southeast 
Asia. Southeast Asia’s structural transformation, from conflict formation to security regime, has seen 
the region move on from its shadowy past and create a distinct and autonomous region with relative 
control over its own boundary, polarity and social construction. The enlargement of ASEAN, the 
impact of the 1997 economic crisis and its widespread political consequences, the environmental 
effects of the forest fires and trans-boundary haze, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, 
the emergence of China as a possible hegemon, and the transnational impact of terrorism have all 
linked the states’ security concerns sufficiently closely together and have highlighted the extent to 
                                                          
166
 Buzan and Waever, 2003; 159. 
167
 Nair, 2008; 119. 
168
 Jones and Smith, 2008; 186. 
169
 Jones and Smith, 2008; 186. 
39 
 
which stability and security cannot be achieved in the absence of coordination.170 The increasing 
threat posed by non-traditional and transnational security issues has ensured that the intensity of 
Southeast Asia’s RSC continues to deepen and regional level cooperation remains an imperative 
feature of the regional security environment. 
Intraregional relations and patterns of amity within Southeast Asia are historically at their most 
peaceful. Nevertheless, the region is still only the sum of its parts and is comprised of individual and 
self-interested states who have accepted the need for economic and security cooperation in the 
pursuit of their own survival. As a result, ASEAN continues to face criticism over its functional 
capacity and ability to cope with sensitive and deeply ingrained issues which threaten the individual 
autonomy of its units. The ASEAN style of diplomacy and the pace with which the “ASEAN way” 
achieves proposed initiatives has also been the source of criticism and has raised questions about 
ASEAN reliance on unbinding consensus-based decision making and has led outsiders “to dismiss 
these meetings as simply talk shows for underemployed bureaucrats.”171 However, and as regional 
security complex theory highlights, the web of security interdependence and the strategies devised 
to cope with it are much more complicated than they may appear. Proximity and familiarity can push 
states together, but historical and cultural baggage can pull them apart. In essence, “there are no 
instant press-buttons solutions to building distinct regional identities and approaches among 
countries that were mostly at logger-heads less than two generations ago.”172 Regionalism in Asia 
has taken on a distinctly Asian form and the regional security framework of Southeast Asia, as 
established and facilitated by ASEAN, does not emulate any other and nor has it aspired to do so.  
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Chapter Five – Regional Security Complex Theory and the South Pacific 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the fundamental propositions of this thesis is that, despite Buzan’s critical remark, the South 
Pacific does satisfy the essential structure of a regional security complex. While acknowledging that 
the regional security dynamics may be weaker than most, and may not share the same lengthy 
history of interegional amity and enmity as experienced by other regional constructs, the security 
and interests of the islands within the region do overlap and regionalism has emerged as a means of 
facing this reality. My objective is to outline the four elements of the essential structure of a regional 
security complex in order to highlight how, even if in its most basic form, the South Pacific as a 
regional space constitutes more than an unstructured region within the international security 
environment. 
In his early work, Buzan posits a distinction between lower level and higher level complexes in which 
the Pacific Islands fit within the definition of the former. He argues that “a lower level complex is 
composed of local states whose power does not extend much, if at all, beyond the range of their 
immediate neighbours. This constraint on power is a key element in the existence of relatively self-
contained local security dynamics among sets of neighbouring states.”173 The higher level complex, 
by contrast, contains states whose power projects far beyond the immediacy of their own regional 
sphere. These complexes involve great power dynamics and are the concern of the global level of 
analysis, whereas lower level complexes are concentrated at the regional level where the 
interactions are most intense. 
Security complexes are, in essence, a natural product of the anarchic structure of the international 
systems174 and thus, with all things being equal,175 we should be able to find complexes that not only 
expand across the entirety of the international system but are also geographically clustered and 
mutually exclusive in their dynamic structure. While some are easily located because the lines of 
security interdependence are markedly distinguished, others are not as straightforward. The South 
Pacific, Buzan notes, represents one such example. The weakness of the states within the region 
limits their capacity to project power beyond their own local and domestic environment and their 
preoccupation with internal instability means that the security interactions between them do not 
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generate a sufficient level of interdependency to warrant a local complex.176 When considering the 
South Pacific, the question becomes - are the islands of the Pacific all equally too weak for a pattern 
to emerge at all, or can this still occur but on a much smaller scale? 
5.2 Conceptualising the South Pacific 
As mentioned previously, defining the parameters of what constitutes a ‘region’ is a complicated 
task and the ‘South Pacific’, or ‘Pacific Islands’, is a strong case in point. Geography plays a major role 
in the conceptualisation of a distinct and mutually exclusive regional complex. Geographical 
elements such as landscape, natural resources and neighbouring states are confined within a 
physical space and are relatively fixed.177 However, the social construction of a region or the ‘idea’ of 
a region is not and the ‘idea’ of what constitutes the region can vary depending on who defines it 
and how they stand to gain.178 Reconciling the discrepancy between the (artificial) social construct of 
the region and its geography can be problematic and can hinder tangible progress towards 
organising a sense of the region. 
Conceptualising the South Pacific is unusually complicated as various labels are often used when 
discussing the region and there is generally a lack of consistency in the application of each label.  
Across the literature, the terms ‘Pacific Islands’ or ‘South Pacific’179 emerges as the most 
appropriate. The term “Pacific Islands” is consistently used to refer to the “22 island polities that fall 
within the scope of the Pacific Community. The term Pacific Islands Countries (PICs) is synonymous 
with this usage and is distinguished from the smaller group of 14 island countries that are members 
of the Pacific Islands Forum.”180 Notably, the term ‘Pacific Islands’ includes the region’s semi-
autonomous territories in addition to the fully autonomous PICs that comprise the Pacific Islands 
Forum.  
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) argues that the term ‘Pacific 
Island Countries’ (PICs) is a term that successfully encapsulates the Pacific’s “two OECD-member 
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countries (Australia and New Zealand), 14 developing and 5 least developed countries.”181 Here the 
parameters of the region are not derived strictly from full membership within the Forum, but also 
incorporate the geographical region’s semi-autonomous territories and explicitly conceptualises 
Australia and New Zealand as ‘Pacific Island Countries’. On this basis, Demography literature also 
defines the region not by the member states of the Pacific Islands Forum, but more so the South 
Pacific Community (SPC) based in Noumea, New Caledonia.182 
 Since both the PIF and SPC are so important in terms of the definition of the region, a short outline 
of the history and function of both organizations is essential. Formerly known as the Pacific Islands 
Commission, the SPC is a regional inter-governmental body that was founded in 1947 by the region’s 
former colonial powers183 and was initially devised to restore stability in the wake of World War Two 
and as a means to cope with the process of decolonisation. Presently, the SPC has an overarching 
vision to provide “a secure and prosperous Pacific community” and believes that this can be 
achieved by managing economic, environmental and social resources in a sustainable way. One of 
the key differences between the PIF and the SPC is that by 1983 the SPC expanded dramatically to 
incorporate all 22 self-governing islands and territories of the South Pacific – all of which share full 
and equal voting rights within the organisation irrespective of their overall autonomy. The SPC is 
purely a social construct whose existence and scope has been arbitrarily defined. The organisation 
was devised to facilitate the decolonisation process for the region’s colonial powers, and not due to 
the need for cooperation to cope with intense and overlapping security concerns. As a result, the 
SPC does not carry the same burden as the Pacific Islands Forum, whose purpose now largely 
embraces such security concerns and is perceived as being the protector of the region. 
Consequently, the SPC does not experience the kind of international pressure experienced by the 
Forum in that the latter is expected to facilitate a safer and more secure environment and to push 
towards establishing stronger mechanisms for coping with threats to regional stability. 
The history of the Pacific Island Forum begins when the South Pacific Forum was created in 1971, 
with a strong colonial power influence. After a gradual transformation and evolution process that 
saw stronger ownership being taken by its island state members, the South Pacific Forum eventually 
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made its name change to the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000. This name change was made on the 
basis that it would provide a better depiction of the region and thus would “better reflect the 
geographic location of its members in the north and south Pacific.”184 While the boundaries of the 
region should not be considered to be determined by membership in the Forum alone, the Forum 
has emerged as the key representation of the PICs as a regional grouping. Furthermore, and given 
that only self-governing states are granted full membership, membership within the Forum is 
indicative of each island’s independence and autonomy.  
In looking at the history of the PIF and SPC, and of the region in general, it is important to note that 
in the modern history of the South Pacific interstate conflict has not been a prominent feature. The 
security structure of the region has taken shape not from the interplay between the individual states 
on the basis of their power and the threat they may represent, but rather on the basis of their 
collective weakness and the impediment this weakness poses to regional prosperity. In the absence 
of a dynamic driven by nationalistic tension, regionalism within the South Pacific has emerged not as 
a means of preventing war from being a viable tool of regional politics, but as a means of 
counteracting the increasingly non-traditional nature of security threats that the region faces. This 
process has taken form predominantly under the auspices of the PIF, whereby the Forum is regarded 
as the ‘driver’ of Pacific regionalism and facilitator of “peace, harmony, security and economic 
prosperity.”185 In this context it is those countries that comprise the Pacific Islands Forum that are 
responsible for binding the region as more of a politically cohesive bloc of autonomous states. 
The history and current role of Australia and New Zealand in relation to the Pacific Islands is 
significant and cannot be left aside in discussing how the region is defined since, despite the central 
role these two play within the Forum, the extent to which Australia or New Zealand would classify 
themselves as ‘Pacific Island’ states is greatly debatable. The term the ‘South Pacific’ has been 
relatively workable, particularly in the sense that unlike the ‘Pacific Islands’ it is slightly more 
ambiguous and does not suggest the same unspoken implication of membership within the 
‘extended Island community’. The term ‘South Pacific’ encapsulates the membership of both 
Australia and New Zealand as being important to the structure of the region, but allows them to 
maintain their own individuality within the international system.  Both Australia and New Zealand 
are inextricably linked to the Pacific Islands but, to a degree, have the capacity to disengage and 
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define the terms of their membership. It is for this reason that I am reluctant to place them fully 
within the parameters of the region and perhaps would prefer to put them on the cusp as insulator 
states: these states, as defined by Buzan, “are standing between regional security complexes and 
defining a location where larger regional security dynamics stand back to back.”186 New Zealand and 
Australia are wedged between involvement within the South Pacific complex and also the wider 
Asia-Pacific region. Yet their involvement in the latter is perhaps less the product of their historical 
ties or their geographical positioning and more so the product of the socially constructed looser 
Asia-Pacific complex, which New Zealand and Australia have actively sought to engage in. 
 The term ‘Oceania’ is also common and is used in a similar vein to the South Pacific, 
notwithstanding its stronger implications of Australian and New Zealand centrality.187 Lastly, the 
term ‘Asia-Pacific’, as introduced above, is frequently used when discussing the links between New 
Zealand, Australia, Southeast and East Asia. It has been very important to note that, despite the use 
of the word Pacific, the Pacific Islands are not implied within this grouping. While the parameters of 
the Asia-Pacific are not fully defined, it is regarded as being the loose and extended community that 
spans from East and South Asia, through Southeast Asia to Australia and New Zealand. The grouping 
exists wholly as a socially driven construct and it lacks the distinctly intertwined security 
environment that essentially underpins security complexes. The ‘Asia-Pacific’ is not a complete and 
functioning complex in and of itself, but is utilised as a useful regional concept. 
Lastly, it is important to recognise that the South Pacific and its states is largely an imposed 
construct. In the lead up to decolonisation it was the colonial powers that arbitrarily defined the 
political borders of the region and, as was the case in much of Africa (albeit to a lesser degree188), 
these borders were not congruent with how Pacific Islanders associate their identity with family and 
tribe before their national territory and state. This has heavily influenced domestic instability in the 
sense that these existing cultural or ethnic boundaries are not necessarily consistent with the 
construction of the new nation-states that were devised to encapsulate them. While these states 
may physically exist as one bloc, there is little cohesion on a socio-political level. These states “either 
do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and societal consensus of sufficient 
strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic 
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political life of the nation.”189 Conflict over land between cultural and ethnic groups has been one of 
the key destabilising domestic forces in many Pacific Islands countries.   
These similarities notwithstanding, and as a result of varied colonial ties, the experiences of each of 
the individual Pacific Island’s has been complex and diverse and each has experienced a different 
road towards self-governance and autonomy. Whilst some sought to embrace Westernised 
democratic ideals almost instantaneously, other islands, such as the kingdom of Tonga, sought to 
maintain their traditional regime for as long as it was palatable for the masses.190   
5.2.1 Geographic South Pacific 
Since Geography plays such a key role the modern history of the Pacific Islands as independent 
nation-states traces back to the post-World War Two period in which “decolonisation established 
this area as the world’s largest concentration of microstates.”191 In terms of geography, “the Pacific 
is conventionally divided into Micronesian, Polynesian, and Melanesian sub-regions, reflecting the 
ethnic character of those islands north, southeast, and southwest of the equator, respectively.”192 
The sub-region of Micronesia incorporates the North-central Pacific area and is characterised by the 
key islands of Nauru, Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and the United States 
flag territories of Guam and Northern Marianas. 
 Polynesia constitutes the Southeast Pacific triangle whose corners are defined by New Zealand, 
Hawaii and Easter Island. The independent states within this sub-region include Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. Polynesia also contains several semi-autonomous 
French colonies, such as French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, and diplomatically maintains 
strong links to New Zealand in particular. Tokelau, Nuie and the Cook Islands are regarded as self-
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governing but in free association with New Zealand and as a result its people are granted New 
Zealand citizenship but the island government is permitted to administer its own affairs.193  
Melanesia comprises those states in the Southwest Pacific area and contains the highest density of 
population within the region: Fiji, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands are its 
defining states. With Papua New Guinea bordering Indonesia, Melanesia is the only sub-region to 
share a physical border with another country and with another regional construct. Given Australia’s 
proximity, Melanesia remains an area in which Australia is most consciously aware of its security 
significance and thus maintains its strongest involvement.  
5.2.2 The History of the South Pacific 
In the 19th century, and earlier, the South Pacific was not immune to the attention of the world’s 
‘imperialistic giants’ who sought to colonize the Islands “in a mad rush to extend their influence to 
what seemed at the time as the ‘outer fringes’ of the world.”194 Nonetheless, as the dominance of 
these powers diminished, and their empires began to collapse, so did their interest in their Pacific 
colonies. The comparative isolation and lack of exploitable resources within these colonies ensured 
that maintenance of ties was more trouble than they were worth. It was in this period that New 
Zealand and Australia “assumed a new, more active role in the Pacific”195 as a means of mitigating 
the effects of colonial disengagement. Renewed interest in the Pacific as a theatre of global relations 
emerged in the form of World War Two – this saw the engagement of the United States with the 
establishment of various military outposts throughout the region. This served to strengthen the 
United States previously non-existent interest in the region. Yet, and in terms of the Pacific’s Cold 
War strategic relevance, interest in the region was very minimal in comparison to Southeast Asia. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, as was the case throughout many regions of the world, a decolonization 
process took place to relieve the former colonial powers “of their bureaucratic responsibilities, and 
to give the Pacific Islands political and economic sovereignty.”196 Independence and self-sufficiency 
via the introduction of transnational corporatism, multilateral and international deregulation197 was 
sought to push the Pacific Islands towards economic prosperity. Ideally, economic prosperity would 
facilitate transforming the islands political environment from its traditional and tribal hierarchy to 
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one of a transparent and viable democracy. However, in the absence of legitimate governmental 
infrastructures this instead “caused a breakdown of distinct national societies, cultural and state 
boundaries and created political disenfranchisement.”198 From their inception, the modern nation-
states of the Pacific Islands have generally “been directed by an inadequate notion of state 
building”199 and thus “have arguably lacked legitimate governance... *and+ failed to construct viable 
states.”200 
Despite the hope and promise enshrined within the ideals of independence, the majority of island 
states did not flourish in the wake of their new found freedom. By contrast, “inept guidance, policy, 
and leadership unfortunately left many of the islands without proper tools or motivation to build 
viable and independent states”201 and thus left behind a mass of politically unstable island states 
that lacked both the capacity and resources to cope with their disintegrating internal dynamics. Both 
politically and economically, and on the most fundamental level, the majority of the autonomous 
islands within the South Pacific still fail to meet their key obligations as a state. Fiji, for example, fails 
to meet all three of its key obligations. Firstly, it cannot secure the physical base of the state against 
destabilising ethnic and cultural groups; secondly, it lacks a united and cohesive idea of the state; 
thirdly, and when considering the numerous incidents of nepotism and bribery that have occurred 
within the government, it is apparent that it also falls short in maintaining a hold on the transparent 
and fair institutional expressions of the state.202  
The Pacific Islands have arguably lacked the capacity to fully embrace the key tenets of western 
democratisation in the form that was imposed upon them in the post-colonial phase. This has been 
due to the fact that these democratic values have not necessarily been compatible with longstanding 
island political traditions. Essentially, it has been suggested that “democracy as a form of 
government is difficult to achieve and implement in the islands because it reflects Western 
conceptions of governance and modernisation” and these notions clash with island history, tradition 
and custom. Furthermore, it has been these traditional beliefs that have stifled economic progress in 
that “communal land ownership, clan loyalty and limited working hours”203 give workers a sense of 
economic security in the absence of actual prosperity. Clan loyalty has been responsible for 
attaching prosperity to nepotism and creates a welfare state with a lack of investment and saving.204 
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In short, clan loyalty is favoured over individual entrepreneurship and as a consequence economic 
growth is minimal and stagnant. 
 In the twenty-first century, “the hope and promise that accompanied Pacific Island states 
emergence from colonialism have dissipated. Corrosive external influences and domestic 
mismanagement have combined to produce weak states, faltering economies, and fractured 
societies”205. The concern is that “the ramifications, though felt mostly by island inhabitants, are 
relevant to their geographic neighbours and past colonists”206 and thereby the impact on stability is 
felt not only at a local level, but also at a regional and international one. In essence, the weakness of 
individual states can either directly or indirectly impact on those in close geographical proximity and 
it is for this reason that the units within the region have sought to bind together as a cohesive bloc in 
order to pursue security, stability and prosperity. 
Regional Security Complex Theory: The Essential Structure 
5.3 BOUNDARY - Is there something differentiating a RSC from its neighbours?  
The archipelagic nature of the South Pacific has ensured that, sinking islands aside, each unit’s 
physical boundary has remained unchanged throughout history. 207 The geographical outline of the 
Pacific region is distinct insofar as its parameters are derived not from the strength of the region 
itself as a mutually exclusive regional space, but rather are defined by a lack of inclusion or strategic 
relevance in any other regional construct. As a result, and when attempting to differentiate the 
boundary of the Pacific as a mutually exclusive region, minor areas come into contention. 
Firstly, one must consider the region’s six semi-autonomous islands, such as American Samoa and 
French Polynesia, which irrespective of their physical and geographical presence within the region 
are still colonial territories that are neither self-governing nor fully independent. 208 The presence of 
existing colonial allegiances alters the role of these islands and it is for this reason that these islands 
are seen as a mere extension of their paternal powers and thus do not share the same equal level of 
interdependence that is experienced by the region’s wholly autonomous units. The South Pacific 
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complex is largely aligned by membership of the Forum in the sense that the Forum reflects the 
socially constructed sphere in which interdependence is acknowledged and securitization is pursued. 
These territories are granted only Associate Membership or Observer status within the Forum and 
thus do not have the same equal capacity to impact on initiatives put forth by the group. These 
islands are not granted the same decision making capabilities as full members, but do have an 
opportunity to offer insight in an ad hoc manner and on terms allocated by the Forum. 
Secondly, there are those states that exist on the cusp of inclusion within the region, but are not 
traditionally regarded as being a part of the South Pacific dynamic. Arguably, these islands share 
some cultural links with their Pacific island counterparts but they have been historically more 
affiliated with their Southeast Asian neighbours than their South Pacific ones. The former Indonesian 
province of East Timor enjoys special observer status within the Forum, much akin to its 
membership within ASEAN, but given its history with Indonesia is unequivocally conceptualised to be 
more a part of the Southeast Asia complex. The Indonesian province of Papua occupies the same 
landmass as the Pacific island of Papua New Guinea and represents the only physical border 
between the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. While conflict over this boundary has been 
comparatively minimal it has not been without tension. Papua New Guinea (PNG) has suffered from 
the spill-over effect in that domestic instability in Papua has seen many flee across the border to 
avoid the outbreak of violence between Papuan natives and the Indonesian military. It has been a 
difficult balance for PNG; although they are sympathetic towards the plight of the Papuans they are 
in no position to defend them.209 While the risk of Indonesian occupation would be unlikely, armed 
conflict of some description would undoubtedly ensue. The most that PNG can realistically do, and 
has continued to do, is maintain the border agreement between the two countries. Significantly, 
PNG is the only PIC to hold official observer status with ASEAN, and be an active member of APEC 
and the ARF. Furthermore, it is notable that, with all complicating variables aside, PNG is lobbying to 
become a full member of ASEAN.210 Whether this hope will become a reality is questionable but 
nonetheless it would add an interesting dynamic to what PNG represented within both RSCs. 
 Recently, and despite being technically a province of Indonesia, West Papua has actively sought to 
engage within the regional framework of the South Pacific. Since being rendered a separate province 
from Papua in 2003, West Papua has further pushed for independence and recently reached out to 
align closer with the regional bodies within the South Pacific. Vanuatu, one of West Papua’s closest 
Pacific neighbours, has supported this manoeuvre and has been vying for West Papua’s inclusion as 
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an observer at the PIF leader’s annual summit meeting. In addition, there has also been an 
expression of interest in engaging in the sub-regional organisation known as the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG).211 This move is perhaps based on the realisation that any attempt to gain 
representation within Southeast Asia’s regional architecture would be regarded as a personal and 
domestic issue for Indonesia and is a manoeuvre which would surely be blocked and cast aside by 
ASEAN on the basis of non-interference. 
The autonomous units within the Pacific Islands are quite distinct in that they barely share physical 
borders with each other. Yet, naturally, there have been minor disputes over ocean territorial 
boundaries between neighbouring islands such as Tonga and Fiji.212 Those that do have overlapping 
physical borders are uniquely placed and additional circumstances have ensured border stability and 
maintenance of the status quo. Papua New Guinea and Papua represent an interesting situation in 
that Papua is still a province of Indonesia and despite Melanesia ties is a part of Southeast Asia. 
Papua New Guinea by contrast has been autonomous since 1975 and is embedded heavily within 
the framework of the extended Pacific Islands community, but does enjoy some political 
engagement within the regional architecture of Southeast Asia.213 In addition, Samoa and American 
Samoa represent the only other countries to share a physical boundary. Notably, whilst Samoa 
(formerly Western Samoa) achieved autonomy in 1962; American Samoa by contrast remains a 
semi-autonomous American territory.   
5.4 ANARCHIC STRUCTURE - Are there two or more autonomous units? 
Arguably, the anarchical structure of the regional system is much akin to that of the international 
system, just densely concentrated and embedded more heavily within an historical pattern of 
relations.  The lack of a ruling authority ensures that each unit within the system must protect 
themselves and their interests from each other. A distinct focus on the survival of the state ensures 
that the state remains the referent object and national security is the central focus. Given that there 
is a limited amount of exploitable resources available to guarantee the survival of the state, security 
is then pursued in a distinctly competitive and nationalistic manner. This traditional dynamic is 
                                                          
211
 “Vanuatu to seek observer status for West Papua at MSG and PIF leaders summits”, Pacific Scoop, 22 June 
2010, [online] <http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2010/06/vanuatu-to-seek-observer-status-for-west-papua-at-msg-
and-pif-leaders-summits/> [accessed 18
 
October 2010]. 
212
 In 1972 the Minerva Reefs were laid claim to by Tonga. Tonga’s claim was subsequently followed by an 
occupation of the reef in the wake of a private groups venture to establish an independent Republic of 
Minerva on the reef. It was not until 2005 that Fiji laid a complaint against Tonga’s claim of ownership, in 
which an official complaint was lodged with the International Seabed Authority. This dispute currently stands 
unresolved. 
213
 PNG do not have the capacity to compete and/or stand up to the strength of the Indonesia military. 
Maintenance of the current status quo is the only option and, as a result, PNG refuses to play any role in 
Papua’s plight for independence. 
51 
 
distorted when its units are so politically and economically weak that they struggle to manage their 
own internal affairs, but nevertheless competitively pursue external ones. The majority of the states 
within the South Pacific are politically and economically underdeveloped microstates and barely 
have the capacity to look beyond their own immediate security environment. Consequently, their 
capacity to focus on the additional and competitive pursuit of territory or resources that are readily 
up for grabs is heavily constrained. 
The anarchical structure of the South Pacific is present, albeit not in a traditional military sense. 
None of the units within the region pose a military threat to each other. The threat that these states 
may pose to each other arises not from their strength, but more so their weakness as a state. 
Subsequently, their desire to survive is derived not from securitising themselves again each other, 
but from securitising themselves against the existential threats that are created by their weakness 
and cannot be mitigated in the absence of cooperation. 
5.5 POLARITY - Is there a distinct distribution of power amongst the units? 
The overall distribution of capabilities among the units of the South Pacific is rather minimal in 
comparison to other regional groupings throughout the world, although a distinct distribution of 
power has emerged and continues to affect the dynamic of the South Pacific complex. Fiji, Papua 
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, for example, represent the largest and most populous islands 
within the South Pacific. As a sub-region, and unlike Polynesia and Micronesia, “Melanesia comprises 
large, mountainous and mainly volcanic island countries, endowed with natural resources, rich soil 
and an abundant marine life.”214 These Melanesian islands are in a better position to capitalise on 
the regional initiatives proposed by the Forum because they can bring more resources and clout to 
the table. Furthermore, they have a higher capacity to attract foreign enterprises that are looking to 
invest in harnessing the region’s resources.215 Micronesia and Polynesia, by contrast, “are made up 
of much smaller island landmasses, and their natural resources are limited to small areas of land and 
the expansive ocean; they mostly contain small atolls with poor soils, with elevations usually 
between one and two meters (Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu).”216  
This distribution of power is best highlighted by the capacity of some states to ‘highjack’ regional 
initiatives for their own benefit and thus use regionalism as a means of pursuing their own 
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nationalist ideals. The establishment of Air Pacific and the University of the South Pacific (USP) both 
provide valuable examples, whereby both were regional initiatives designed to represent the region 
as a whole, yet due to the logistical advantages of having them based in Fiji, were manoeuvred by Fiji 
in such as way to monopolise their benefits.  Air Pacific is now regarded as the national airline of Fiji 
and the location of the USP in Suva has ensured that Fiji benefit more highly from the appointment 
of staff and as the academic hub of the islands.217 
In order to securitize a threat at the regional level it is imperative that the majority of the region’s 
members are convinced that a particular security threat is of equal concern to all. Consequently, 
those with fewer resources to convey their concerns are going to be more heavily disadvantaged in 
the pursuit of securitization. The regional distribution of power, therefore, can distort the security 
agenda and the Small Island States (SIS) within the Forum experience a reduced capacity to 
securitize threats. Significantly, the inhibiting nature of the region’s distribution of power has not 
gone uncompensated and, in 2005 with the implementation of the Pacific Plan, the Forum 
acknowledged the discrepancy between the capabilities of the Forum’s smaller island members and 
it’s more developed ones. This was formally recognised in 2006 with the establishment of the 
Smaller Island States Unit which proposed the need “to advocate the special and peculiar needs of 
Smaller Island States; provide special assistance for the implementation of the Pacific Plan, and 
ensure that they derive the fullest possible benefit from the Plan, particularly given their limited 
capacity and fragile and vulnerable environment.”218 The aim of this unit has been to provide a 
collective voice for the SIS and to help counteract the lack of resources they may experience. 
Furthermore, assist in highlighting the fact that the establishment of a framework of initiatives to 
provide a safe and secure environment may be one thing, but having the capacity and resources to 
implement them is another.  
Lastly, whilst economic integration was viewed as an excellent starting point to balance out the 
power structure of Europe, this is not the case for the South Pacific.  In the European context 
economic integration represented a low risk area of political conflict and was a viable basis upon 
which to fabricate the beginnings of a framework for regional cooperation. However, the wide gap in 
economic potential between the varying South Pacific islands has seen this issue become highly 
politically charged. Economic integration has been slow and stagnant as previous attempts to 
coordinate regional initiatives have seen the distribution of power come into play as individual states 
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have used their power to pursue their own national interests. This is not to say there has been no 
progress; cooperation in regards to transportation, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ’s) and education 
have been met with relative success. Some of the more ambitious regional projects, however, have 
been met with great controversy and conflict over larger Island states monopolising the direction of 
the projects and thus contributing to the poor distribution of its generated wealth. As previously 
mentioned, Fiji has used its central position within the region to capitalise on the success of various 
projects. Inevitably, this has left a sour taste in the mouth of those states that felt their interests 
were being railroaded by those with larger economies and larger populations. 
5.6 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION - Are there patterns of amity and enmity?  
RSCT observes that patterns of amity/enmity are more intensive on a regional level due to the fact 
that “the specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally not imported to the system level, 
but generally internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions.”219 
These patterns intensify regional dynamics as ordinary assessments of power distribution are 
distorted by the additional elements of proximity and familiarity. RSCT suggests that “within this 
approach, and along with power relations, durable conflicts and long term historical rivalries, the 
security dynamics in a RSC also depend on the way actors, mostly but not exclusively states, 
construct their identity.”220 The social construction of the region is just as crucial as the existential 
threats that the units within the region collectively face, thus, “the complication is that it is really the 
relationships (the moves) that tie together, not the particular referent objects.”221   
The geographically sparse and economically underdeveloped nature of the Pacific archipelago has 
facilitated a strong and region-wide preoccupation with internal stability. Historically, interstate 
conflict has been minimal with various minor territorial and diplomatic quarrels between island 
states. These conflicts, however, pale in comparison to the many armed conflicts experienced in 
other regions of the world and it would be difficult to argue that the interstate relations in the South 
Pacific have ever been intense enough to be described as one of conflict formation. Within the South 
Pacific patterns of amity and enmity do exist, just predominantly in the postcolonial world and 
generally more amity than enmity.  Yet, while these patterns do not fall within the parameters of a 
conflict formation they are by no means strong enough to warrant a security regime either.  
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The socially constructed identity of the South Pacific dates back to 1947 with the creation of the SPC, 
but unlike the regional initiatives of Southeast Asia with ASEAN or Africa with the OAU (now the AU) 
this collective identity was fabricated not by the member states themselves but by the former 
colonial powers. The SPC was, by and large, imposed regionalism to lift post-colonial burdens and 
thus was less about binding the regional states together as a community at the grass-roots level than 
it was about pragmatically managing extra-regional obligations in the process of post-colonial 
transformation. Regional collaboration in the South Pacific was superficial and rested more heavily 
on the basis that “the well-being of Pacific Island states is defined more in terms of their 
relationships (individual and collective) with major international aid donors than by their intra-
regional neighbours.”222 
It has been the evolution of regionalism in the South Pacific and the transformation of the Pacific 
Islands Forum as the region’s preeminent driving force that has been pivotal to the history of 
interstate amity and enmity in the Pacific Islands. The social construction of a common identity has 
drawn the units within the region closer together and this has facilitated a stronger power 
distribution and pattern of relations. In the past it has been bilateral ties and colonial links with 
outside powers that constituted the source of key support and resources for PICs. Now, however, 
under the auspice of the Forum, the region’s island states must manage their extra-regional 
relations in a collective manner as a regional grouping and not as individual units.  Needless to say, 
this has altered the regional dynamic and has heightened the patterns of amity and enmity in the 
region. The grouping as a whole is only as cohesive as its least cooperative member and internal 
disagreements amongst member states reflect poorly upon the group as a whole. The overwhelming 
reliance on outside financial and political support ensures that the lack of group cohesion has the 
capacity to impinge on their relations with international donors and furthermore, particular pressure 
is enforced by those external donors whose support is conditioned on the maintenance of 
Westphalian democratic values. In addition, a failure to cooperate with each other also 
compromises support from non-state actors such as the European Union or the Commonwealth as it 
highlights the ineffectiveness of the PIF to adequately manage its internal dynamics.223  
Although armed conflict between neighbouring states has been rare in the South Pacific, security has 
emerged as a significant focus in the modern framework of Pacific regionalism. Arguably this is not 
                                                          
222
 Ian Campbell, ‘Tongan Development and Pacific Island Security Issues.’ In The Asia-Pacific: A Region in 
Transition, ed. by Jim Rolfe (Honolulu, Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Centre for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 136.  
223
 Fiji was suspended from the Commonwealth on the basis that the country’s interim government was 
responsible for persistently violating the fundamental political principles of the Commonwealth. “Fiji 
suspended from Commonwealth”, BBC News, 1 September 2009 [online] 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/8231717.stm> [accessed 11 June 2011]. Relations with the EU are still 
favourable as the PIF continues to negotiate free trade agreements. 
55 
 
the product of a typical balance-of-power dynamic or the presence of a security dilemma, but rather 
of the extent to which there is a distinct link between internal domestic stability and the social and 
economic prosperity that the region strives to attain. As noted previously, the region is only as 
strong as its weakest member and given that “the Pacific regional security environment has become 
increasingly complex and diverse”224 this has demanded a stronger framework for regional security 
cooperation. A safer and more secure overarching security environment cannot be achieved in the 
absence of a viable and sustainable environment for economic and social development. Consistent 
with global trends in security, the increasingly transnational nature of security threats has ensured 
that the islands of the Pacific have had many mutual threats to contend with, including: “increasing 
transnational organised criminal activity in various forms; internal conflicts and crises threatening 
the stability of Member and their neighbouring States; the ever present global threat of terrorism; 
governance challenged to Government Agencies as well as limited legal and law enforcement and 
capacity.”225 Consistent with this growing reality, and over the past two decades, the PICs as a 
regional group226 have implemented several key agreements that have had a substantially significant 
security focus. In 1992, the Honiara Declaration proposed increased law enforcement coordination. 
Later on, this initiative was further expanded with the establishment of guiding principles in the 
1997 Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation. In the wake of unrest in both Fiji and 
the Solomon Islands the Biketawa Declaration (2000) represented a definitive measure  in the 
Forum’s history and outlined not only the guiding principles pertaining to regional security, but also 
proposed a course of action in the event of a domestic crisis threatening regional stability. The 
Biketawa Declaration marked a groundbreaking step in the social construction of the region as it 
recognised that there were limits to the highly regarded values of individual sovereignty and non-
interference in domestic affairs and acknowledged that in certain instances the Forum should (and 
would) take action as a matter of region-wide safety and security. Lastly, the most recent and 
comprehensive security initiative emerged in the form of the Pacific Plan in 2005. This long-term 
plan proposed a “new and innovated approach to the unique challenges that Pacific Island Countries 
face through a framework of greater regional cooperation and integration.”227 Four key pillars 
underpin the Pacific Plan and are regarded as being fundamental challenges to the region and the 
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well-being of its people. These pillars are economic growth, sustainable development, good 
governance and, lastly, security.   
Domestic instability has become increasingly relevant to the functionality of the Pacific Islands 
Forum. The scathing reactions from fellow Island states to the political upheavals in Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Fiji in particular, illustrate the extent to which neighbouring states 
are conscious of internal instability and how it may impact the regional dynamic.228  Whilst many 
island states have openly avoided ‘choosing sides’ in these situations, apparent fluctuations in 
patterns of amity and enmity have taken place. Relations between Fiji and Papua New Guinea have 
been particularly strained when Fiji’s domestic crisis started to negatively impact on Papua New 
Guinea’s own internal struggle. In 2005 it was revealed that Fijian mercenaries had been illegally 
arming and training private militia in the autonomous province of Bougainville and actively 
facilitating unrest.229 This was viewed by the Autonomous Bougainville Government as a breach in 
Papua New Guinea’s agreement to take responsibility for “defence, foreign policy and the broader 
security of the island”230 and raised questions about the extent to which the Papua New Guinean 
government was aware of the Fijian’s activities. However, ostensibly, tensions seem to have 
subsided and Papua New Guinean Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare expressed his support for the 
Fijian government with a lengthy speech at the island’s 40 year celebration of independence in 2010. 
Despite its theoretical progress towards taking a tougher stance on the internal stability of member 
states, the Forum has still failed to step up in a practical sense. A lack of consensus on the 
suspension of Fiji from the Forum has been apparent despite Fiji’s failure to meet the prerequisites 
outlined by the Forum itself. A clear divide within the PIF exists; members of the sub-regional 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) were openly reluctant to suspend Fiji, yet states such as 
Australia and New Zealand were determined to maintain their tough stance towards Fiji’s interim 
government throughout.231 As a result, PNG, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have sought a subtle, 
conciliatory approach to their relations with Fiji, and have reportedly made private proposals.232 This 
is a reflection of the vast differences between New Zealand and Australia, and the island countries 
within the region and it is this dynamic that represents the most distinct pattern of amity/enmity. 
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One of the biggest functional obstacles faced by the Forum to date has been conflict over Fiji and its 
place in the regional institution in the wake of the 2006 military coup. It is important to note that, 
despite regional agreements in place allowing for Forum-led intervention, all major regional 
interventions that have taken place have not done so under the auspices of the Forum. Whilst the 
Forum has given its blessing for the proposed course of action, both major projects in the Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI)233 and Papua New Guinea have been actively spearheaded by New Zealand, 
Australia or the United Nations respectively. Needless to say, the inclusion of New Zealand and 
Australia as equal members within the regional framework of the South Pacific has significantly 
impacted on regional dynamics. It is interesting to consider how, in the absence of pressure from the 
Forum’s two largest financial patrons, intervention in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea 
may have taken on a completely different shape (if it were even to take place) and also raises the 
question as to whether Fiji would have been suspended from the Forum at all if the positioning of 
New Zealand and Australia were different. 
The involvement of New Zealand and Australia is complicated but necessary and is a careful balance 
between their contributing to the region and their imposing themselves on the region. RSCT 
suggests that “in defining the shape and structure of security complexes, cultural and racial patterns 
may well be an important contributing factor, though they come second to the patterns of security 
perception which are the principal defining factors.”234 Thus, while cultural and racial ties are 
important in the later stages of organising regional constructs and perhaps their progression 
towards building a regional security community, they are not central in their initial development. 
Buzan notes, however, that “the question of whether cultural and racial ties should be a factor in 
identifying security complexes is an interesting one. It seems not unlikely that shared cultural and 
racial characteristics among a group of states would cause them both to pay more attention to each 
other in general, and to legitimize mutual interventions in each other’s security affairs.”235 The 
Pacific Islands Forum has used the notion of an ‘extended Pacific family’ in the 2000 Biketawa 
Declaration as a means of justifying the need to facilitate in improving the internal stability of its 
member states. The ‘extended Pacific family’ notion is regarded as an extension of the ‘Pacific Way’ 
and is a mantra that embodies the extent to which the region’s history, proximity and familiarity 
may bind its members together with a sense of ‘region-ness.’  In essence, regional norms and 
initiatives are grounded not by law and obligation, but by mutual respect and trust. 
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5.7 Summary 
Finally, as Buzan and Waever argue, in an unstructured region the security dynamic is essentially 
inward-looking and dominated by internal interactions and, thereby “no regional RSC exists because 
the units do not become each other’s main security concern.”236 In a traditional sense, the units 
within the South Pacific do not see each other as being a military threat or direct risk to their survival 
and domestic stability is the most imminent concern. They do, however, view each other’s weakness 
or domestic instability as being a threat to the overall functionality of the region: whereby, the 
threat posed by neighbouring units is not derived from their strength as a power, but from their 
weakness as a state. While governance issues are problematic and do have transnational 
implications, they do not, however, have a regionalizing effect in quite the same way that intense 
and overlapping security threats do. The existence of a RSC and the emergence of regionalism as a 
coping mechanism have a tendency to go hand in hand, in that the web of interdependence that 
underpins the complex perpetuates the need for regionalism and, reciprocally, habits of regionalism 
can lead to a deeper web of interdependence.   
The development of South Pacific regionalism has not emerged in a way that is congruent with the 
dynamics of RSCs and RSCT. South Pacific regionalism initially emerged as an initiative of colonial and 
neo-colonial states in the pursuit of managing the transition of the Pacific Islands to independence. 
As such, the history of regionalism and the region as an autonomous construct is not as lengthy as it 
may appear.  In effect, the transformation of the SPC into the PIF in 1999 represents the 
decolonisation of South Pacific regionalism and the self-determination of the Pacific Islands as an 
‘extended Pacific family.’ Nonetheless, the dynamics of the security environment itself are not 
responsible for the autonomy of the regional level and the extent to which outside factors have 
impinged on regional security dynamics is inconsistent with the existence of a complex. In sum, the 
South Pacific is not entirely unstructured in terms of its security environment, yet it is hardly 
organised either. A lack of interstate conflict and competition ensures that as a regional space it 
constitutes more than a conflict formation, yet its incapacity to manage its own security affairs, both 
financially and logistically, ensures that it is not a security regime either. The South Pacific 
constitutes some form of nascent and weak complex, but exists in an uncategorized league of its 
own.  
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Chapter Six - Cross-Comparative Analysis: Southeast Asia and the South Pacific 
6.1 Introduction 
The key distinguishing feature of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is that it recognises the 
enduring and dynamic structure of the regional level and seeks not to predict, but to identify the 
means by which the context and the personality of the units within the region can produce particular 
patterns of security or insecurity. Historical and cultural circumstances drive individual complexes in 
different directions and thus the job of understanding each mutually exclusive complex on its own 
terms, whilst still maintaining common themes in order to allow for cross-comparison, is becoming 
increasingly difficult.237 The regions of the world cannot be compared without formulating 
theoretical concepts that establish a common basis of comparison.238 RSCT offers the concept of 
securitisation as its definitive theoretical tool for recognising regional variation and proposes that “a 
securitisation based theory will accept that the security agenda is about different things in different 
regions: the actors differ, as does the relative importance of different sectors.”239 Because it allows 
regions to be driven by their own conditions and context, securitisation removes prejudices on how 
people ‘should’ react given a certain set of circumstances and regional security becomes “not a 
question of state versus other units, but of what kind of relations these units – states and/or others 
– form among themselves.”240 
The framework of RSCT relies on the specification of four interrelated levels of analysis: (a) domestic 
order in which fears are derived from instability and vulnerabilities; (b) state-to-state relations; (c) 
inter-regional interactions with neighbouring regions;241 and (d) the impact of global powers in the 
region. The interplay between these levels defines the essential structure of an RSC. As discussed in 
previous chapters, the four variables that characterise the essential structure are: (a) boundary, 
which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours; (b) anarchic structure, in which the complex 
requires two or more autonomous units; (c) polarity, or the distribution of power among the 
region’s units; and (d) social construction, or the definition of patterns of amity and enmity among 
units. 
 
 
                                                          
237
 Buzan and Waever, 2003; 85. 
238
 Buzan and Waever, 2003; 85. 
239
 Buzan and Waever, 2003; 85. 
240
 Buzan and Waever, 2003; 476. 
241
 Buzan argues that this level is relatively limited except when major changes of security interdependence are 
gaining momentum. 
60 
 
6.1.1 Regions of Cross-Comparison 
The transformation of Southeast Asia and the development of ASEAN have provided regionalist 
specialists with “an important and rich area of investigation into the study of security communities. 
Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN has lived through a major shift in the regional security and 
stability of Southeast Asia.”242 Now, more so than ever before, the Southeast Asian RSC is being 
defined from within the region and on non-western terms, and thus has the capacity to provide an 
insight into the establishment of security mechanisms that do not necessarily adhere to the values 
underpinning those of their Western counterparts. The South Pacific, by contrast, is a fresh area of 
interest and, given the size and economic capacity of the units that comprise the region, the islands 
of the Pacific have been neglected as a stand alone regional construct in the sphere of international 
relations. As previously mentioned, in Buzan and Waever’s most recent conceptualisation of RSCT 
they noted that there were a variety of regional spaces that characterised different areas of the 
world; ranging from unstructured, to pre- and proto-complexes, to a full-fledged security complex. 
Theoretically, and on the basis that increased trade, technological innovation, and advancements in 
transportation have made the world a much smaller place, even the most remote areas of the world 
are now interlinked with their neighbours and need to manage their relations accordingly. These 
links, of varying degrees, now span the world and whilst “parts of Africa and possibly central Asia are 
pre- and proto-complexes”243 an unstructured region is a regional space that is in retreat and in its 
pure form no longer exists. Yet, the South Pacific is defined by Buzan and Waever as the last 
‘unstructured’ regional space in the world; whereby the units within the region possess an 
insufficient level of interdependence in order to have what would be constituted as a viable 
dynamic. Thus, despite the region’s history of regionalism, the South Pacific has gone relatively 
unnoticed in terms of its security architecture and what it represents as a regional construct.  
Despite their close proximity to each other, therefore, the South Pacific and Southeast Asia 
represent two very distinct regional complexes. The essential structure of Southeast Asia has 
transformed dramatically and an extensive regional security architecture has emerged and 
contributed to the stability of its regional order. The essential structure of the South Pacific has been 
weaker and less dynamic. Despite similarities between the two regions and, the South Pacific’s 
emulation of Southeast Asia’s regional structures, the South Pacific has lacked equal evolution and 
failed to manage its structure and security concerns with any efficacy. The purpose of this cross-
comparison is to ascertain: 1) what are the key differences between the regional security complexes 
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of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific and, 2) how have these differences led to a variation in 
development? 
There are certain elements of similarity between the two regions, both in terms of historical 
elements and the perspectives held on regional cooperation. However, regionalism in Southeast Asia 
has taken on a life of its own and in the South Pacific it has been slow to develop and achieve results. 
Why has Southeast Asia developed an intense security complex and the South Pacific hasn’t? What is 
it about the South Pacific that prevents the intensity of overlapping security needs and why, despite 
its regional framework, do its units not experience the same interdependence that inextricably links 
their security to that of their neighbours?  
It is important to acknowledge that no two regions are the same and, as Buzan and Waever note, 
there is an obvious dichotomy between uniqueness and generalisation that makes a cross-
comparison difficult. There are particular general elements (the essential structure) that do 
transcend the immediate context and “whatever their differences, regions are fundamentally 
comparable in terms of the elements of basic structure.”244 This cross-comparison will consider the 
basic structure of these two regions, as established in the previous chapters, and why or how these 
structures have facilitated the strength (or weakness) of the development of a regional security 
complex.   
FRAMEWORK OF CROSS-COMPARISON 
For any given comparison of RSCs, the following variables must be addressed: 
6.2 Positioning on spectrum from conflict formation (balance-of-power system) through security 
regime to security community. 
A region’s position on the spectrum from conflict formation through security regime to a mature 
security community is determined not only by the type of interstate interaction, but also the 
genuine cohesiveness and internalisation of values underpinning its overall regional order. So as to 
best understand interstate relationships, Buzan and Waever draw on Alex Wendt’s constructivist 
scheme for characterising social structures and argue that, whilst it is not entirely fitting, the 
fundamentals of this scheme do help to typify aspects of regional level interstate interaction and 
where the dynamics of their relationship may best fit on this spectrum.245 Wendt proposes that 
there are two critical features of a social structure that must be acknowledged: “first, that all 
anarchies fall into one of three types of social structure (Hobbesian = enemy relations; Lockean = 
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rivalry within some rules; Kantian = friendly relations and strong restraints on war); and second, that 
these social structures can vary in their depth and mode of internalisation from shallow (coerced) 
through middling (calculations of self-interest) to deep (ideas accepted as legitimate).”246 On this 
basis, it is not only the nature of the historical relations between the units that determines the 
complex’s place on the spectrum, but the genuine internalisation of the ideas that are jointly 
established as a result of these interactions. 
The characteristics of the three categories on the spectrum are as follows: 
6.2.1 Conflict Formation  
A conflict formation is unambiguous and describes units in a close formation whose interactions are 
characterised by fear and rivalry. It is a dynamic in which traditional security agendas prevail and, 
whilst some organisational framework may extend across the region, traditional state-versus-state 
conflict is the primary type of interaction. The units within this dynamic are typically weak states 
that are inward looking and plagued by internal instability. However, and in spite of their 
preoccupation with domestic issues, the security environment of these states are intertwined and it 
is an interdependence that persists irrespective of whether it is acknowledged or not. Instability in 
one state can easily disrupt the balance in a neighbouring one; be it through the example of a 
revolution (leading to the suggestion that it is a viable solution for the current political situation) or 
through the effect it has on refugees illegally crossing borders and seeking asylum in neighbouring 
countries.  The extent to which these states lack the capacity to manage their own affairs can often 
permeate the regional level and cause tensions between neighbours.  
6.2.2 Security Regime 
A security regime is a structure in which member states have established a cooperative framework 
and have agreed upon conditions that best suit their needs (both as individual units and as a 
collective grouping), but do not regard armed conflict between neighbours as being inconceivable. 
As mentioned previously, “security regimes are more akin to what Deutsch called a ‘no-war 
community,’... *it+ is a first step towards a full-fledged security community, but unlike a security 
community a no-war community is one in which ‘the possibility of war is still expected and to some 
extent preparations are made for it.”247 
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6.2.3 Mature Security Community  
Lastly, a mature security community is regarded as the holistic embodiment of regionalism and 
regionalisation whereby the framework of the regional level is entirely paramount and the initiatives 
established at this level go above and beyond the national agenda of its member-states. 
Furthermore, the key aim of a security community “is to develop the common interests of actors in 
peace and stability, rather than to deter or balance a common threat.”248 Thus, the use force 
between members as a means of dealing with conflict becomes completely unthinkable. The aim is 
to meet persistent calls for ‘peace, security, prosperity and progress’ and to establish a regional 
community which is invested in a shared identity and aspiration among its people and 
governments.249 A mature security community represents the most evolved regional social structure 
and requires mutual interest and genuine trust between elites as well as at the grassroots level 
amongst the masses. Intergroup trust at the local level is crucial as “regional communities can surely 
be imagined by elites, but to be meaningful and sustainable they would also have to be anchored in 
the domain of popular approval and participation.”250  
6.2.4 Spectrum Characterisation of Southeast Asia  
Immediate post-WWII Southeast Asia was an environment characterised by intense conflict 
formation. Consistent with Wendt’s scheme, and as the painful process of state-formation took 
place, fear and rivalry dominated much of the regional dynamic with particular patterns emerging 
within the two Southeast Asian sub-complexes; mainland Indochina and the maritime Malay 
Archipelago. After the onset of the Cold War, and previous lacklustre attempts at cooperation, the 
establishment of ASEAN in 1967 marked the first successful step away from conflict formation and 
towards an institutional framework of peaceful resolution. With the creation of ASEAN its founding 
member-states agreed to “a firm foundation for common action to promote regional 
cooperation”251 and sought to establish a framework whereby they could incrementally reduce fear 
and rivalry via mutual and trust building interactions. In its formative years, ASEAN did not have the 
strength to form the basis of a regional security regime, nor was security an explicit aim on the 
organisation’s agenda. ASEANs inception did, however, symbolise a critical stage in Southeast Asia’s 
transition from conflict formation to security regime. Both Southeast Asia as a region, and ASEAN as 
an institutional body, have evolved significantly in the past four decades. ASEAN is now the driving 
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force behind Southeast Asian regionalism and represents the core of Southeast Asia’s security 
regime. Lastly, and with the expansion of its membership base in the 1990s, ASEAN now completely 
rests at the centre of Southeast Asia’s regional security regime and, Timor-Leste aside, attempts to 
encapsulate the total sum of geopolitical Southeast Asia.252  
 Having experienced 44 years of interstate peace, Southeast Asia represents the most successful 
structural transition from conflict formation to security regime in the Third World. Nonetheless, 
traditional realist concerns about power still contribute to the regional dynamic and, despite the 
lengthy history of regional cooperation; the states within Southeast Asia’s RSC are still not willing to 
entirely rule out military means in the resolution of disputes between neighbours.  Potential 
flashpoints for military confrontation continue to highlight that tension between member states still 
exists and that national agendas still trump regional ones. The Indochina sub-complex has been 
particularly problematic as bitter historical disputes persist and Southeast Asia’s security regime has 
not managed to diplomatically alleviate interstate tension. This has been exemplified by recent and 
intermittent armed clashes over the area surrounding a Buddhist temple bordering Thailand and 
Cambodia in which both parties claim territorial ownership.253 Furthermore, the South China Sea has 
continued to remain a regional hotspot for conflict as fundamental conflicts over islands, maritime 
space and resources have not been resolved.254 Overlapping territorial claims between several 
Southeast Asian states including Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as China, have led to 
quarrels over UNCLOS regulations and EEZ zones.255 In both these instances, diplomacy has failed to 
deliver results. Given that peaceful resolution via diplomatic means is a definitive element of a 
security community, Southeast Asia’s security environment invariably remains characterised as a 
security regime. 
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The traditional concern of national security is “the use of and threat of using military force to secure 
the state.”256 The credibility of one’s force is directly proportionate to the capabilities of those 
surrounding it and “thus keeping a careful watch on those capabilities becomes an important nexus 
in the state’s security calculations.”257 During the formative years of Southeast Asia’s RSC, and its 
conflict formation phase, the presence of rivalry between states and an overt focus on military 
security were dominant features of the regional dynamic. As a result, concerns over the emergence 
of a security dilemma, military competition and even an arms race within the region have featured 
heavily in the literature on Asian security in the post-Cold War era. Even now, despite the region’s 
transformation to security regime and the development of an extensive regional security 
architecture, traditional military security concerns continue to be an area of focus.258 In the past two 
decades, arms expenditure for many Southeast Asian states has not decreased; in fact, it has 
progressively risen. Regional observers have been left trying to explain how this trend fits into the 
“regional security calculus”259 and what potential impact it may have on the regional security 
dynamic.  
Prior to the Asian economic crisis in 1997, a substantial increase in arms expenditure occurred in 
much of the region. Currently, and as the region recovers from the effects of the Asian crisis and 
subsequent periods of global level financial insecurity, “there are signs that weapon procurement is 
rising again.”260 While this may be the case, and this trend may have an impact on the regional 
dynamic in the long run, it does not necessarily reflect a change in patterns of fear and rivalry at the 
regional level. It is more likely that this trend is a manifestation of the shifting power dynamic in the 
wider East Asia region; in which China’s growth and military manoeuvring have inevitably 
heightened focus on the military capabilities of individual Southeast Asian states. In addition, 
increased military expenditure may also be attributed to “the cyclic process of replacing old and 
worn out equipment.”261 These concerns are a constant reality for many Southeast Asia states.  
Nonetheless, and irrespective of the abundance of regional initiatives and cooperative mechanisms 
established, the consciousness of each state about the power capabilities of their neighbours has 
never truly subsided and military action as a means of improving an individual state’s security has 
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not been rendered inconceivable.262 As a result, it is difficult to argue that Southeast Asia is anything 
more than a security regime as the key Deutschian concept of the ‘undesirability of war’ has not 
been entirely achieved.    
6.2.5 Spectrum Characterisation of the South Pacific 
The South Pacific has never experienced the same degree of conflict as Southeast Asia, and thus the 
region has never realistically constituted a conflict formation. As a result, both the establishment of 
regional order and the significance of regionalism have been subtle and incremental. The 
fragmented nature of the units within the region, in combination with their economic 
underdevelopment, has ensured that prior to the last decade the region has remained relatively 
unstructured in its security dynamic. The underlying threats faced by the region are derived not from 
the power of the units, but from their weakness and thus the intensity of interaction between its 
units (be it cooperative or conflictual) has essentially been low. The South Pacific has slowly gained 
its regional security structure and the early basis for a security regime from the need to stabilize 
non-traditional security threats. Whilst such threats are less intense and less imminent than 
traditional military threats, they do require regional order and coordination to mitigate and this is 
something the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) has recognised. In comparison to Southeast Asia, the depth 
of institutionalism in the South Pacific is shallow and the PIF’s momentum relies heavily on Australia 
and New Zealand for funding and resources, in addition to the tenacity to make critical decisions. 
Nonetheless, a degree of structure and regional order has developed so as to cope with the region’s 
security environment. The South Pacific, it can be argued, constitutes a limited security regime. 
6.2.6 Cross-Comparison 
Whilst the security regimes of the two regions vary in strength and depth there are several 
similarities between the two: there is a distinct absence of collective defence, security has 
developed as an implicit not explicit value; and sensitive security issues relating to internal stability 
are a constant test of regional values of non-interference and individual autonomy. 
 Collective defence, regarded as the most traditional security alliance, may have a long history in 
Europe, but in the Asia-Pacific “collective defence effectively has played no role.”263 As argued by 
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Maull, “the principal reason for a lack of collective defence in Pacific Asia, however, was distrust 
among the potential candidates and fear of entanglement with US policies.”264 Yet today, and 
despite the diminished role of the US and increased trust between neighbours, explicit and binding 
defence alliances do not exist. The ultimate focus within the security regimes of both regions has 
been the implementation of comprehensive or cooperative security, in which both like-minded and 
non-like minded states are engaged: the security agenda is inclusive and looks beyond military 
security, and continuous dialogue facilitates trust.265 
In both the South Pacific and Southeast Asia contemporary concepts of security cooperation 
underpin their security regimes. Member-states acknowledge that security cannot be attained at the 
expense of one’s neighbour and that comprehensive security requires a framework that is both 
multidimensional and transcends sectors. In both regions, the similarity of this approach has led to 
shared experiences regarding a lack of explicit security cooperation and also the difficulty of 
integrating sensitive internal security concerns into the regional security agenda. Consequently, and 
whilst order exists and initiatives are proposed, in times of crisis tangible results have been difficult 
to achieve. Previous instances have highlighted how both regional frameworks have struggled to 
cope with domestic level security concerns that have a potentially destabilizing effect at the regional 
level. Sensitive security issues have been either ignored and passed off as strictly internal concerns, 
or conflict resolution has been “sanctioned” by the region’s institutional body but carried out by a 
third party. In the South Pacific, this was the case in PNG as well as in the Solomon Islands and in 
Southeast Asia this was the case in both Cambodia and East Timor. In each case it was agreed at the 
regional level that conflict could not be resolved domestically and that external intervention was 
necessary, albeit to be conducted under the auspices of a third party (i.e. Australia, New Zealand, or 
the United Nations) and not the regional institution itself.   
In spite of criticism that ASEAN lacks ‘teeth’ in regards to sensitive security issues, Southeast Asia 
constitutes a more mature security regime than the South Pacific. In comparison to Southeast Asia, 
the South Pacific does possess a similar regional order, institutional security framework and a desire 
for peaceful resolution, but to a far lesser degree. Security interdependence in the South Pacific 
lacks the strength of Southeast Asia and thus the fates of its units are not bound together with the 
same sense of intensity. Lastly, and despite the presence of a security regime, Southeast Asian and 
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Pacific Island states “tend to prize their sovereignty highly and can be acutely sensitive to perceived 
intrusions thereon.”266 
6.3 Type of region: overlaid, unstructured, pre- and proto- complexes, or RSCs. And if a RSC, then 
standard, centred, or great power? 
Southeast Asia, formerly overlaid during the Cold War, is a standard regional security complex. The 
region has emerged as a fully-fledged and autonomous complex in its own right and is the only Asian 
sub-region comprised entirely of small to medium powers. As a result, Southeast Asia is a standard 
complex with a relatively even distribution of power. The South Pacific as a regional space has 
changed substantially since decolonisation took place, yet the region’s evolution pales in comparison 
to that of Southeast Asia. The South Pacific is, at best, a standard nascent RSC. However, it is 
extremely weak, porous and vulnerable to changing patterns of extra-regional engagement. 
As a regional space, the South Pacific once represented a prototypical unstructured region. Steadily, 
and significantly in the past decade, regional level interactions have increased as the region has seen 
its units become more interlinked and cohesive as a regional bloc. The driving force behind this 
transformation, however, lacks the intensity and interdependency of the Southeast Asian security 
complex. The history of interstate conflict in the South Pacific is minimal compared to many regions 
and, as a result, the relationships between the region’s units are less volatile than the pre or proto-
complexes that typically exist in areas such as Africa. With the development of the Pacific Islands 
Forum, and key regional initiatives such as the Biketawa Declaration and the 2005 Pacific Plan, the 
South Pacific has gained significant structure. Yet, the region continues to lack the interdependence 
needed to facilitate the intensity of the regional level such as to make it the crucial level at which 
security can be achieved. 
 The transformation of the South Pacific from unstructured region to security complex has been slow 
and is not yet complete. The region’s stagnated development may be attributed to several factors; 
namely, the extent to which the South Pacific is fragmented, geographically sparse, and relies heavily 
on economic aid. Unlike Southeast Asia, the regional level is not fully autonomous and a committed 
focus on regional level concerns has been hard to develop and sustain. The capacity of the region to 
function self-sufficiently in the absence of economic aid is questionable and, whilst it may be 
speculated that by restructuring inefficient and ineffective bureaucracies key regional players could 
have the capacity to engage in the international market in a functional and productive way, it has 
been remarked that the region’s geographical nature is its central impediment and that this drives a 
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range of logistical issues that are difficult to fix.267 Geography has created a context in which “ethnic 
cleavages and conflict, governmental corruption, natural resource depletion, and trade inequality”268 
are typical characteristics, and the extent to which these elements are embedded in the core of the 
state are “just a few of the variables that keep the islands from gaining such an idealistic status”269 of 
economic independence. Furthermore, the South Pacific is geographically disadvantaged in ways far 
beyond the states’ control as natural disasters and the impact of rising water levels threatens to 
destroy and displace entire islands themselves.270 
Whilst the South Pacific and Southeast Asia share similar security concerns in regards to the internal 
instability of individual countries, the dynamics of their complexes vary significantly in this respect. 
Southeast Asia is a distinct regional security complex. It is a region whose intense and tumultuous 
history of conflict and interaction has inextricably bound the fates of its constituent states together. 
Consequently, and irrespective of their diversity, these states have been driven together in the need 
to form a cohesive approach towards a common goal of peace, stability and prosperity. The need to 
gain control of the region’s security environment is derived from the type of threats that the region’s 
states face collectively as a group (both in terms of past threats and those predicted for the future). 
Southeast Asian interdependence is derived from the extent to which managing extra-regional 
involvement and also facilitating economic prosperity rely heavily on coordination, and cannot 
holistically be achieved by individual units.  
In contrast, the South Pacific has struggled to develop the same kind of imperative for cooperation. 
This may be attributed to the fact that the region’s fundamental security concerns are neither 
immediate nor imminent – they feel little threat of attack from each other or major powers and their 
instability is derived internally from non-traditional threats such as the spread of disease, economic 
instability, climate change and elements of human security stemming from state weakness. 
Ultimately, the crucial issues facing the people of the Pacific are welfare issues and despite being 
concerns of the societal sector, the problems and solutions are not contained strictly within this 
sector. It is the lack of socio-political cohesion and the underdeveloped ‘idea’ of the state in these 
nation-states that is the source of much unrest. It has been the lack of socio-political cohesiveness 
that has seen ethnic cleavages transfer from the societal sector to the political. Fiji, for example, is a 
case in point. Tension between native Fijians and Indo-Fijians over the Fijian identity has become 
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inextricably linked to tension over political leadership.271 Welfare issues can cause a significant level 
of tension at both the domestic and regional level but, because welfare concerns manifest 
incrementally and internally within society, they are harder to securitize as they lack the clear 
breaking point required of existential threats. 272  In addition, it is difficult to push welfare issues as 
an imminent concern on a regional level irrespective of the extent to which they affect the stability 
of the unit and its place within the complex.  
6.4 Dominant unit(s) among which the dynamics of securitisation occur 
In the case of both Southeast Asia and the South Pacific individual states are still the most central 
units. However, the nature of interdependence determines that strength and autonomy as 
individual units is directly linked to the dynamics of securitization at the regional level and the ability 
to act as a regionally cohesive unit. ASEAN and the PIF represent a single voice for the units that 
comprise their respective regions; yet all individual states still strongly maintain their national 
sovereignty and the right to individual autonomy. Unlike the European Union, neither region has 
(nor have they expressed a desire to create) an overarching supranational body in which sovereignty 
would be pooled and control would be ceded. This shared feature of both complexes is apparent in 
the similarity between the ‘ASEAN Way’ and the ‘Pacific Way’ and the extent to which both 
organisations have moulded their frameworks around the ideals of non-intervention in domestic 
issues; maintenance of individual sovereignty; and agreement through non-binding, trust-based 
consensus. On the one hand, it has been argued that a lack of legality and formality in the ethos of 
both institutional frameworks has hindered progress towards tangible progress, whilst the ASEAN 
style of diplomacy, on the other hand, has been hailed by others for its ability to develop genuine 
bonds based on trust and honesty between governments despite historical grievances.  Arguably, 
the belief is that enabling cooperation by fostering genuine relationships that will stand the test of 
time is more important than obligations bound to legal documentation. As such, the state firmly 
remains the unit that drives the process of securitization in both regions.  
6.5 Dominant sectors driving the dynamics of securitisation 
By mapping sectors of securitization, RSCT aims to capture how local dynamics impact on the pursuit 
of security at the regional level, in particular the kinds of issues that are moved onto the 
securitization agenda and what that suggests about the nature of the RSC itself. Buzan and Waever 
highlight the idea that “there is a correlation between sector of securitisation and position on 
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spectrum from conflict formation to security community. Military and political and/or societal 
security dominate in most of the conflict formations, whereas economic and societal is usually 
prominent in the security communities.”273 Arguably “the causal arrow here points in both 
directions: political-military securitisation causes conflict and, when you have conflict, you turn to 
the strongest instruments which often include the military one.”274 As previously acknowledged, the 
concept of security in both Southeast Asia and the South Pacific is strongly state-centric and 
nationalistic, albeit with a regional focus on comprehensive security via self-asserting and 
autonomous regional frameworks. Theoretically, and by mapping the dominant sectors of 
securitization within each of the regions, securitization theory should provide a platform for 
recognising key differences that may exist between the RSCs of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. 
In the post-Cold War era the broadening and deepening of the security discourse has seen a clear 
change in both the sources of insecurity within different sectors and also, the divisibility between 
them. Securitization theory suggests that security is the outcome of a particular social process in 
which a threat, irrespective of its origin, is deemed potentially destabilizing and thus, security is not 
an objective condition in and of itself. As a result, the military sector and traditional security threats 
are no longer the central focus and potential sources of insecurity are perceived as being not only 
non-military, but also transnational in scope. In essence, traditional and non-traditional threats 
interact with and reinforce each other and, in order to manage the effects of a widening security 
agenda, securitization needs to take place across sectors and be coordinated on multiple levels. The 
broadening of security, however, has made the process of distinguishing securitization within 
individual sectors increasingly problematic. The interplay between the origins of a threat, its impact, 
and the sector in which it needs to be securitized have a tendency to overlap and that this thesis 
suggests that it would be more comprehensive to focus on regional patterns of securitization across 
traditional and non-traditional threats as opposed to across the individual sectors themselves. 
6.5.1 Traditional Security in Southeast Asia 
The securitization of traditional threats has been a minimal feature of regional level cooperation 
throughout the history of Southeast Asia. The intention of ASEAN as a multilateral institution is not, 
and never has been, the creation of a military alliance. Increasing demands for cooperation have 
ensured the durability of regional patterns of amity and have enabled ASEAN to adopt clear norms 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes.275 In the post-Cold War era the concept of ‘comprehensive 
security’ has been used to underpin regionalism in Southeast Asia whereby, both military and non-
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military threats are recognized as an impediment to the overall well-being of its member states.276 
As a result, regional cooperation has moved beyond its initial focus of facilitating positive intra-
ASEAN relations and has acknowledged the necessity of counteracting security threats that originate 
from within all sectors and equally contribute to insecurity and instability. Significantly, and to date, 
“the only strong multilateral security organization in South-East Asia is the Five Power Defence 
Arrangement (FPDA) among Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain.”277 The FPDA, 
forty years since its inception, is still active and continues to organise joint defence exercises within 
the region. Nonetheless, the FPDA’s most valuable contribution still remains facilitating increased 
cooperation between Singapore and Malaysia during the formative years of the region’s security 
regime. Additionally, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994, was devised as a further 
mechanism for security cooperation. However, and despite emerging “with much fanfare and with 
the aim of progressing steadily from military confidence-building measures to preventative 
diplomacy and, eventually, to conflict resolution,”278 the ARF has not provided any basis for military 
cooperation and traditional security concerns still continue to be dealt with predominantly on a 
unilateral or bilateral basis. 
6.5.2 Non-Traditional Security in Southeast Asia 
Notwithstanding the ARF’s shortcomings in regards to traditional security concerns, it has 
contributed to highlighting the need to securitize non-traditional security threats at the regional 
level. Crime, piracy, drug trafficking, terrorism, and illegal immigration have all been listed by the 
ARF as being among the top threats facing the region.  The origin of such threats may be located in 
particular sectors: however, the implications of individual threats interact with and facilitate 
instability across various sectors. The securitization of the following non-traditional security threats 
have featured prominently within the regional level dynamic: 
6.5.3 Maritime Security 
Maritime security, be it common piracy, politically motivated piracy or maritime terrorism, has been 
one of the most significant areas of security cooperation in the region and has highlighted the need 
for comprehensive securitization. However, the securitization of piracy highlights the difficulty faced 
in separating security threats and the sectors in which they are targeted. The Straits of Malacca, 
which flow through and overlap the territorial seas of several ASEAN member states, is defined as 
being the waterway “between the west coast of Thailand and Malaysia in the northeast, and the 
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coast of Sumatra in the southwest.”279 The Straits represent the key link between the Indian Ocean 
and Northeast Asia in the Pacific and is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world. The 
importance of the Straits ensures that its security has an overlapping impact in virtually all sectors 
and the immediacy of its effects is felt by all, both directly via the political-military sector and 
indirectly via the economic sector.   
 In essence, the threat posed by insecurity within the Straits of Malacca is that it has the potential to 
disrupt shipping routes and the flow of trade, and whilst this reality may be considered an economic 
security concern, its securitization requires the deployment of military resources, institutional 
reform to criminalize transnational crime, and synchronized political responses regarding border 
control and the rights of law enforcers in the maritime jurisdictions of neighbouring countries.280 In 
2001 the securitization of piracy and other maritime threats received notable attention at the ARF 
where maritime security was outlined as being “an indispensible and fundamental pillar for the 
construct of economic welfare and security in the ASEAN region.”281 Upon the inception of the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 maritime security also featured prominently on 
the ADMM agenda and the need for increased cooperation garnered further attention. The 
securitization of maritime security has facilitated the development of cooperative mechanisms in the 
form of information sharing networks and joint shore exercises. Notably, the most significant 
capacity-building effort to come from regional level securitization has been the introduction of the 
Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP). The MSP, consisting of an air-surveillance component, an Intelligence 
Exchange Group, plus Joint Coordination Committee,282 has made significant progress in improving 
practical cooperation in patrolling the Straits and represents an instance of regional level 
securitization which has produced tangible results.    
6.5.4 International Terrorism 
Southeast Asia’s geostrategic position has exacerbated the role of political threats challenging the 
‘idea’ of the state and its organizational stability. Terrorism, for example, is a political threat that 
targets national identities and organising ideologies in the pursuit of change to the current order. It 
is an issue that has taken on a regionalising dynamic: as the ARF duly notes, “terrorism, irrespective 
of its origins, motivations or objectives continues to pose serious threats to regional and 
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international peace and stability.”283 Terrorism currently features highly on the region’s 
securitization agenda yet, despite having a lengthy history in Southeast Asia, it was not until the 
events of September 11 2001 that ASEAN articulated a common stand against terrorism.284 In 
November 2001, ASEAN members endorsed the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
Terrorism285 and asked its signatories “to improve intelligence sharing and collaboration among their 
law enforcement agencies, to provide assistance on border surveillance, immigration and financial 
issues to comply with UN resolutions on terrorism.”286  However, and whilst the speech act of 
securitization took place, “the divergent domestic interests between Indonesia on one hand and 
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines on the other hand undermined the attainment of a regional 
agreement and the formulation of more concrete measures.”287  Indonesia’s initial reluctance to 
acknowledge the American initiated “war on terror” resulted in a distinct disconnect between policy 
and practice. It was not until 2002, when the Bali nightclub bombings took place, which were then 
followed by several further incidents,288 that Indonesia’s policy began to change and acknowledged 
the need to fully engage in the securitization of terrorism at the regional level.289  Since 2002, the 
securitization of terrorism has had some success and has increased the capacity of law enforcement 
groups to detain key figures within terrorist organisations.290 However, disagreements over “threat 
perceptions and how far ASEAN members should go in discussing domestic aspects of terrorism’s 
origins and impacts”291 has exacerbated the prevalence of ASEAN members acting unilaterally or 
bilaterally with extra-regional powers, such as the United States.292  
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6.5.5 Environmental Degradation 
In the past decade environmental security has taken on a supplementary role in the regionalizing 
dynamic of Southeast Asian securitization. The relevance of the environmental sector is driven by 
the nexus of civilisation and environment in which “a dynamic, interdependent relationship exists 
between [the] environment and politics: Civilization is held responsible for part of its own structural 
environmental conditions, which limit or enlarge its development options and influence incentives 
for cooperation and conflict.”293  Global environmental issues such as climate change and the 
sustainability of food and energy resources, as well as regionally specific issues such as trans-
boundary haze, water scarcity in Singapore and the utilisation of the Mekong Delta River in 
Indochina, have begun to take prominence on the regional agenda and the need to consider the 
securitization of environmental issues to avoid future conflict has become a reality. The growing 
significance of environmental security concerns has been addressed in some of ASEAN’s most 
comprehensive documents, such as  the ‘Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009 – 2015,’294 which 
have referenced the need to cooperate and highlighted the role that environmental threats play in 
the pursuit of sustainable development or, rather, the hindering of. Nonetheless, the pursuit of 
environmental security is multifaceted and securitizing moves need to take place at all levels in 
order to be effective. Furthermore, regionally specific issues have the added difficultly of moving on 
to a political agenda that is already driven by the dynamics of the regional security environment.     
6.5.6 Traditional and Non-Traditional Security in the South Pacific 
In Third World states, domestic political concerns are the “typical lens through which threats are 
judged.”295 This is not to say that external threats do not exist within the regional security 
environment, but more so that such threats “often attain prominence largely because of the 
conflicts that abound within Third World states.”296 The South Pacific is comprised of weak and 
underdeveloped states with extensive internal security concerns resulting largely from ethnic 
differences, land disputes, economic disparities and a lack of confidence in government resolution 
capabilities.297 The political instability of individual countries has previously been left off the agenda 
at the regional level for fear that Forum intervention would be considered a breach of sovereignty. 
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However, and as a result of violent instability in three of the region’s largest countries, 298  the 2000 
Biketawa Declaration 299 marked a fundamental change and acknowledged the link between 
domestic level stability and regional security. The Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC),300 
which meets annually and combines “regional law enforcement secretariats, stakeholders and 
development partners to discuss various law enforcement and security related issues,”301 has 
identified internal threats to be of equal importance to external ones.  
Regionalism in the South Pacific has been functioning for forty years, yet explicit dialogue regarding 
security and regional level securitization has been slow to develop. The military sector has played a 
very minimal role in the security dynamic at the regional level. Interstate relations have been largely 
amicable and a lack of conflict between both neighbouring Islands and external powers has ensured 
that military cooperation has not developed as a feature of regional interaction. Traditionally the 
security focus of the Forum was to address threats that were “anti-colonial in nature such as French 
nuclear testing and New Caledonian decolonisation, or second-order matters such as natural 
disasters and environmental damage.”302 The broadening of the security agenda and the increasing 
realities of security interdependence has had an influential impact on the South Pacific and, more so 
than ever before, has demanded a regionally cohesive approach to potential sources of insecurity; 
namely, transnational crime and environmental degradation. 
6.5.7 Transnational Crime 
The South Pacific is plagued by weak and underdeveloped states whose economic infrastructures 
have continually struggled to cope with the creation of new global markets. Transnational business 
opportunities, both legal and illegal, have prospered as a result of globalization. It has been the 
combination of reduced national border restrictions with an increase in the mobility of goods, 
people, and services303 which has facilitated the expansion of business interactions throughout the 
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region and the world. However, the political and economic weakness of the Pacific islands has made 
the region particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of increased interactions and transnational 
crime has become a growing security concern. Resource and infrastructural limitations have ensured 
that individual states cannot cope with transnational crime in the absence of regional securitization. 
Consequently, the role of the PIF Secretariat has been paramount: the PIF has actively sought to 
formulate “best practice legislation, immigration and policing models for circulation and 
consideration,”304 as well as looking for ways to reduce aid and development funds being spent on 
unnecessary and overlapping programmes.  The need for cooperative measures has been duly 
recognised at the regional level. The problem is, however, that border control has “often been 
hampered by a lack of high-technology equipment and accompanying infrastructure”305 and the 
endemic nature of corruption306 within the South Pacific has also served to inhibit and undermine 
the success of crime targeting regional initiatives. 
6.5.8 Environmental Degradation   
The securitization of threats from within the environmental sector has also featured prominently 
within the regional level security dynamic. The negative consequences of environmental degradation 
have the potential to have both an economic and societal effect which, in turn, becomes politicised. 
Furthermore, the threat that climate change poses to the South Pacific has become increasingly 
evident as rising sea levels threaten the destruction of complete islands and the potential 
displacement of entire island populations. The reality of rising sea levels will inevitably impact on the 
wider region and put pressure on both national governments and the PIF to facilitate the relocation 
of refugees and the mitigation of social and political issues that may ensue as a result. Regional level 
environmental action has been focused on via relevant Council of Regional Organisations of the 
Pacific (CROP) agencies such as the intergovernmental organisation known as the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme (SPREP).307 The focus has been on adaptive strategies, as opposed to 
counteractive strategies, and the implementation of regional level initiatives that assist island 
nations in best coping with the effects environmental security. Such initiatives have previously 
included “preparing roads for flooding in the Federated States of Micronesia; improving sea walls 
and drainage systems in the Cook Islands; and relocating gardens, planting salt-resistant crops and 
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reviving the fishing industry in Solomon Islands atolls.”308 Additionally, the PIF has repeatedly called 
on the international community to increasingly engage in the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and to strengthen their commitment to the reduction of carbon emissions, the 
use of cleaner fuels, and the increased use of renewable energy resources.309 Nonetheless, and at 
both the regional and international level, the securitization of the environmental sector is highly 
politicised and a difficult area in which progress may be achieved.    
6.5.9 Cross-comparison 
The impact of decolonisation and state formation have seen Southeast Asia and the South Pacific 
share contextual commonalities that have resulted in similar patterns of securitization in regards to 
particular non-traditional threats and the avoidance of cooperation in regards to others. The political 
sector is typically perceived as the most dominant sector within the securitization dynamic at the 
regional level as, “in some sense, all security is political... politicization is political by definition, and, 
by extension, to securitize is a political act.”310 It is the overspill quality of insecurity that is of critical 
relevance and the recognition of the fact that security threats in one sector inevitably impact on 
security in another. Consequently, and in combination with the political sector, additional sectors 
have been supplementary in the pursuit of regional securitization, but not necessarily in a 
distinguishable way. Arguably, the interplay between sectors has ensured that focusing on the 
threats themselves, as opposed to individual sectors, better highlights the role securitization plays in 
the dynamics of the RSC and what this may emphasize about the RSC itself.  Both ASEAN and the PIF 
have followed similar processes of establishing a regional security architecture that is best suited to 
the securitization of particular types of threats: namely, those that can be focused on without 
compromising the territorial integrity and autonomy of its individual units. The evolution of which, 
perhaps, may be attributed more to the increasing depth of security interdependence within the RSC 
as opposed to an increased capacity of its member states to compromise national sovereignty in the 
pursuit of regional stability.  However, the speech act, or “the process of staging something as an 
existential threat,”311 and the acknowledgement of a need for regional level securitization, in and of 
itself, is not enough. Similarities in the principles of the ‘ASEAN Way’ and the ‘Pacific Way’ have seen 
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securitization rhetoric occur, but with tangible results being stagnated and generally slow to 
develop. 
 Based on the premise that the ‘virtuous cycle’ of economic growth will lead to domestic stability 
and international security,312 both regions have placed economic cooperation high on the regional 
agenda. Economic cooperation, however, is a part of the process but not the subject of securitization 
itself. In Southeast Asia in particular, the ‘economic-security nexus’313 has provided an incentive for 
regional cooperation and, in the post-Cold War era, has contributed to the institutionalisation of 
formal regional arrangements.314  A refreshed regional focus on economic security occurred as a 
result of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, whereby region-wide economic collapse highlighted the 
need for a strengthened regional response to the repercussions of globalization and the increasing 
reality of economic interdependence. By the Seventh ARF meeting in July 2000, and with “the 
emergence of an Asia-only form of regional economic cooperation,”315 the challenges and 
uncertainties posed by globalization became a prominent feature on the regional security agenda.316 
The relationship between non-traditional security threats affecting the region, such as terrorism and 
piracy, and their impact on the economic prosperity of its units has ensured that economic security 
is a significant feature of the security agenda, albeit its regional level relevance is mostly derived 
from the need to consolidate and expand the growth of ASEAN as a cohesive bloc so as to better 
enable the region to engage in the international system. 
By contrast, economic security has played less of a successful and regionalizing role in the South 
Pacific, whereby economic regionalism has been highly politicised and vulnerable to the intractable 
security politics of the region. Regional economic pursuits have been hindered by a level of distrust 
stemming from a fear that larger states will highjack certain arrangements for their own nationalistic 
interest.317 Furthermore, attempts to incorporate the South Pacific in the global free trade regime 
via initiatives such as the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP countries318 and the 
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Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) with Australia and New Zealand, have 
received a mixed reception and it has been argued that exposure to global competitiveness could 
potentially “undermine economies and exacerbate dependence on aid”319 as well as have negative 
political implications.320   
In both the South Pacific and Southeast Asia threats from within the societal sector have also failed 
to have a regionalizing effect and “no strong elements of interlocking societal fears are found at the 
scale of the region.”321 Thus, and in comparison to other sectors, societal security issues have 
remained relevant more at the global or local-transnational level.322 The global level element is 
derived from the extent to which ASEAN’s institutional framework is embedded in the ‘ASEAN Way’ 
and its own set of ‘Asia specific values’ and the way in which it provides an alternative ideological 
perspective to the typically “Western-dominated international agenda.”323 In a similar vein, the 
‘Pacific Way’ has sought to reject traditional Western frameworks of institutionalism and to define 
itself on its own terms. With that said, the influence of Australia and New Zealand as central 
members of the PIF and significant regional aid donors has prevented an entirely non-western 
ideology taking hold.324 The relevance of the local-transnational level is derived from conflict 
between ethnic groups and minorities. This is particularly apparent with the Chinese population 
throughout Southeast Asia and the South Pacific in which the fear of the ‘Greater Chinese Empire’ 
has been the source of racially driven violence. Incidents of such conflict include the Sino-Malay race 
riots in Malaysia in 1969; the May 1998 riots in Indonesia;325 and anti-Chinese fuelled arson attacks 
in Mount Hagen, PNG.326  In addition, the ongoing and tumultuous relationship between native 
Fijians and Fijian-Indians has also highlighted the extent to which local-transnational conflict can be 
problematic within the societal sector. 
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Regional level coordination is evident within both regions, albeit with particular types of threats 
eliciting more successful results than others. Mapping the types of threats that dominate the 
securitization agenda within each of the regions has highlighted the relationship between the 
complex and its securitization whereby the depth of interdependency within the RSC directly 
impacts on the securitization agenda. In the case of Southeast Asia, interdependency is the driving 
force behind security cooperation and securitization is motivated not by altruism, but by self-
interest. National security needs, in regards to key non-traditional threats, cannot be met in the 
absence of regional cooperation and thus regional level securitization prevails predominantly out of 
necessity. The RSC of the South Pacific lacks the same intensity of interdependence that is present 
within the dynamic of its Southeast Asian counterpart. The threats facing the islands of the South 
Pacific may be shared by their neighbours but, notwithstanding growing concerns over transnational 
crime, they are not exacerbated directly by them. In some sense, the securitization agenda of the 
South Pacific is more socially constructed and thus slower to progress. The threats within the South 
Pacific lack the clear breaking point required to bridge the gap between policy and practice.  
The interdependent security relationship between the units of the Southeast Asian RSC is far more 
distinct than that of the South Pacific. The extent to which both non-traditional and traditional 
security concerns threaten the region have a relatively direct impact, and a transnational effect, 
ensures that the consciousness of interdependence persists and facilitates regional coordination in 
the development of coping mechanisms. Nationalism and self-interest still prevail and will only be 
conceded when security cannot be attained at a national level. It is for this reason that maritime 
security, international terrorism and environmental degradation have been most successful, albeit 
success is relative and discrepancies between policy and practice will always exist. The South Pacific, 
by contrast, does not share the same depth of interdependency that has the capacity to generate its 
own necessity driven securitization agenda. The RSC of the South Pacific is not wholly autonomous 
and the regional dynamic is not derived entirely from with the region. The South Pacific is more 
susceptible to outside pressure and influence which, in turn, creates a securitization agenda that is 
not necessarily consistent with the needs perceived by those within the region itself. In sum, and as 
argued by Pacific expert Ron Crocombe, “more will be gained if Pacific Island countries decline 
current pressures for across-the-board closer integration among the countries of the Pacific Islands 
Forum and instead identify what degree of regional integration will provide the best solutions for 
their peoples for particular purposes and what region is the most appropriate for each purpose.”327 
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6.6 Dominant levels on which the dynamics of securitisation occur 
 Securitization can take place on one or more of four levels; global, interregional, regional, or 
domestic.  The dominant level upon which securitization occurs is driven not by the origin of threat, 
but how the threat is targeted. In the process of securitization it is the actors, not the threat, that 
determine “who or what is defined as the (origin of) threats, and whom the actor targets in 
countermeasures.”328 In Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, the chains of interaction between 
actors is significantly higher on the regional level than the global, interregional or domestic  and the 
regional level has been typically regarded as the best possible means through which securitization 
may be managed. The development of geographically coherent regional constructs and their 
attempt to mitigate security threats which are local, but transnational, are a direct reflection on the 
prominence of the regional level within the securitization dynamic. 
6.6.1 The Securitization Dynamic of Southeast Asia  
In Southeast Asia, the regional level enjoys a strong degree of autonomy and regional chains of 
interaction have emerged as being the core of the securitization dynamic. The prominence of the 
regional level within this dynamic is linked to the degree of security interdependence experienced by 
its units. In essence, distance matters and securitization within Southeast Asia targets threats that 
are more intensely felt within the complex than outside of it, and the region’s securitizing actors 
have maintained that the solutions to these problems can be achieved at the regional level. 
Consistent with this rationale, transnational crime represents a significant issue area “because it 
takes a network character, and much of its business is land-based, such as smuggling drugs, people, 
or arms across borders, and therefore distance matters – it is ceteris paribus easier over short than 
long distances.”329 Despite their global origin and impact, regional solutions have also been sought 
for security issues such as terrorism330 and piracy as regional level securitization in the form of law 
enforcement and border control coordination is regarded as the most manageable countermeasures 
approach.  
Since its inception in 1994, the ARF has been the key forum for securitization based discussion. 
However, specific issue area meetings, such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on transnational 
crime (AMMTC), have also emerged. Created in 1997, the AMMTC meets every two years with an 
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agenda of coordinating national authorities in an approach to target crimes such as terrorism, 
trafficking, money laundering and piracy.331 Transnational crime is central to regional level 
securitization as in the absence of regional cooperation it is a security threat that cannot be 
counteracted. 
Unequivocally, ASEAN centrality resides at the core of Southeast Asia’s securitization dynamic. Who 
or what is defined as a threat, and the coping strategies that emerge as a result, are directly linked 
to the nature of the RSC and the web of security interdependence. Yet, and whilst the ongoing ethos 
of ASEAN has been ‘regional solutions to regional problems’, this is not to say that the global level 
plays no role. Major powers and international organisations are socialised into the framework under 
the terms and conditions determined by the specific issue area forums, but the impact of the 
international system on the decision making process has been intentionally minimalised by ASEAN 
itself. As a result, the United Nations, for example, has played a minimal role in the region’s pursuits 
of securitization and suggested help has been quietly rejected. For example, in 2007 the United 
Nations Department of Political Affairs “proposed the establishment of a regional office in Singapore 
– this proposal would have given the DPA a regional platform from which to build states’ mediation 
and dialogue capacity and promote collective responses to regional security challenges.”332 
However, this initiative was rejected by regional actors and the UN’s engagement continues to be 
restricted. 333 
The prominence of the regional level in the dynamics of securitization is paramount, albeit there has 
been a steady increase in securitization at the interregional level. The development of the EAS and 
the expansion of the ADMM to ADMM – Plus334 have substantially widened the partners with which 
ASEAN states are willing to talk about regional security issues. Whilst regionalism within the Asia-
Pacific is looser and less intertwined than that of Southeast Asia itself, the ADMM-Plus is still gaining 
momentum as a platform for Asian and Pacific countries to discuss common transnational security 
issues. The establishment of the ADMM-Plus has received positive attention and highlighted 
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ASEAN’s growing acknowledgement of the role that extra- regional powers can play in the mitigation 
of non-traditional security threats.335 
6.6.2 The Securitization Dynamic of the South Pacific  
The chains of interaction in regard to securitization are also at their most prominent at the regional 
level in the South Pacific. In a similar fashion to Southeast Asia, and as expressed by the Forum’s 
Secretary General of the Secretariat, Tuiloma Neroni Slade, “a myriad of serious cross-border and 
trans-national crimes, compounded by devastating impacts of the global financial and economic 
crisis, including climate change and natural disasters, add to complications and challenges for our 
region.”336 These concerns represent security threats that are best managed at the regional level. 
Since its transformation from the South Pacific Forum to the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000, the PIF 
has fashioned itself as an arena for South Pacific securitization. As previously noted, Forum 
initiatives such as the 2000 Biketawa Declaration and, most recently, the 2005 Pacific Plan are a 
direct reflection of regional level securitization and highlight the prominence of regional approaches 
to threat management regardless of the threat’s origin; be it governance at the domestic level or 
climate change at the international level.  
The regional securitization dynamics of the South Pacific are not wholly autonomous and, unlike 
ASEAN, the PIF does not have the capacity to insulate the regional level from the effects of the 
global level. The South Pacific is extremely vulnerable to shifting dynamics in the international 
system and the reality of this has become increasingly apparent as the South Pacific has begun to 
emerge as a strategically relevant area in the current global level interplay between China and the 
United States. China and the US have been increasingly vying for closer alignment with states in the 
Asia-Pacific and over the past two decades China has progressively increased its ties throughout the 
Pacific establishing diplomatic relations with eight (of the fourteen) member-states of the Pacific 
Islands Forum.337 In a similar vein, the United States has more overtly sought to make its desire to re-
engage in the Asia-Pacific region known. After officially announcing its renewed military ties with 
New Zealand late in 2010, the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, went on to announce that the US is 
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to establish a USAID base in support of the Pacific islands located in Fiji.338 Given Fiji’s current 
suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum this represented an extremely bold move on behalf of the 
US and reflects Fiji’s centrality in the region despite its domestic political situation.  
In the South Pacific, environmental security concerns mark an overlapping area of securitization 
integrating both the international and regional level. In the South Pacific, and whilst a majority of 
securitization is outlined on a regional level, economic incapacity ensures that some issues such as 
the effects of climate change are securitized at the international level. Climate change, for example, 
is an existential threat that can displace and destroy entire islands and this cannot be confronted 
strictly on a regional level.  In fact, for the majority of the Asia-Pacific climate change is increasingly 
becoming an imminent concern and “is now expected to have major geostrategic implications, such 
as destabilization of state governments, the fuelling of terrorism, and the mass movement of 
refugees and internally displaced persons.”339    
6.7 The stability of the essential structure, potential sources of instability, patterns of interregional 
interaction and the probability of external transformation 
Having celebrated over forty years of existence, ASEAN has emerged as the centralizing figure 
driving the stability of Southeast Asia’s essential structure. All key variables of the essential structure 
have proven to be stable and have remained relatively unchanged over the previous two decades. In 
fact, and notwithstanding recent tension between Thailand and Cambodia over the area surrounding 
the Preah Vihear temple, Southeast Asia “has never been more stable and free of conflict.”340 By 
contrast, the South Pacific’s transformation from unstructured region to a nascent regional security 
complex is still too incomplete and weak to be considered stable. The dynamics that drive the RSC of 
the South Pacific are underdeveloped at the regional level and are vulnerable to internal and 
external influences. The PIF does represent a source of regional order but, unlike ASEAN, it does not 
have the capacity to control the variables determining the region’s essential structure.  
6.7.1 Stability of the Essential Structure – Cross-Comparison  
Southeast Asia’s essential structure emerged from the conflictual process of decolonisation and 
despite initially being characterised by conflict and rivalry, regional patterns of interaction are now 
largely amicable. Furthermore, the transnational nature of the region’s security concerns has 
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ensured that the transformation from conflict to cooperation is steady as individual state’s security 
cannot be achieved in the absence of regional cooperation. 
 Regardless of ASEAN’s progress since 1967, the capacity of Southeast Asia’s regional framework to 
make measurable progress towards the mitigation of security threats at the regional level remains 
tentative. The essential structure of region is currently stable, albeit the variables underpinning 
regional stability are not fixed and patterns of amity are reversible. The overall dynamic of the region 
is stable, yet small ongoing issues within each element of the essential structure leave some 
ambiguity over how superficial this stability may be. ASEAN’s inability to confront the ongoing 
structural issues and pursue actual policy outcomes is a significant functional flaw and is regarded as 
one of “too much redundancy, and too much architecture that does nothing at all.”341 Criticisms over 
functionality have given rise to two key questions regarding Asia’s institutional architecture: why is 
there no regional multilateral security organisation and why do Asia’s institutions remain ‘soft’? The 
omission of these elements in its regional security architecture is a significant impediment to the 
stability of the structure and the biggest hindrance to further evolution.342  
The stability of the South Pacific’s essential structure is even more difficult to assure. In Southeast 
Asia the level of security interdependence is intense enough to ensure that certain variables will 
remain unchanged. The rising concern of transnational crime and the role of economic cooperation 
in the pursuit of regional security and stability guarantees that amicable relations will continue. The 
South Pacific, however, does not share this same intertwined intensity and as a result is more 
vulnerable to disruption and slower functionality.     
6.7.2 Territorial disputes as a Source of Structural Instability 
Ongoing territorial disputes within both regions highlight the weaknesses in relationships between 
neighbouring units and the extent to which traditional issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty 
still come into play and are a source of instability. 
In the South Pacific, a diplomatic dispute between Tonga and Fiji over territorial ownership of the 
Minerva reefs has been an ongoing issue that resurfaced in 2009 and remains unresolved in 2011. 
Tonga’s ownership dates back to its claim of the reefs in 1972, in which Tonga then established a 
lighthouse and began maintaining patrolling of the area.  In late 2009, Fiji claimed the reefs as their 
own and as a sign of clout sent naval ships to destroy navigation lights and to chase away passing 
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yachts. 343 The implications of such a dispute are yet to be ascertained, but what this incident 
highlights is that despite the South Pacific’s history of amicable relations potential flashpoints do 
exist and have the capacity to compromise positive regional dynamics. 344 
 In Southeast Asia, “bilateral geopolitical disputes exist almost across the entire spectrum of states in 
Southeast Asia, and include both territorial and resource disputes.”345 Significantly, in the past 
decade, it has been Indochina that has been particularly problematic.346 The 2008 Thai-Cambodia 
border crisis347 marks a significant conflict “in which the UNESCO World Heritage listing of the Preah 
Vihear Temple in Cambodia rekindled Thai contestation of the Temple and its nearby border.”348  
Other significant and ongoing territorial disputes include “the islands and waters of the South China 
Sea which are contested by the Southeast Asian states of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam, as well as by China and Taiwan,”349 as well as conflict over “the energy-rich Gulf of 
Thailand, contested by Thailand and Vietnam; and the Ambalat maritime area, over which ongoing 
Indonesian-Malaysian tensions heightened [in 2009] with Indonesia accusing Malaysia of a naval 
incursion into its waters.”350 Lastly, the utilisation of the Mekong River has been a source of tension 
between the mainland ASEAN member states. In order to better manage these tensions, the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC) was established in 1995 and comprises Thailand, Cambodia, Laos 
PDR, and Vietnam.351 However, in spite of an established forum for joint decisions, tensions continue 
to persist as Laotian officials propose the construction of a Hydro dam at Xayaburi without fellow 
MRC member support.352 
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6.7.3 The Potential for Internal Transformation 
Both regions have similar potential for internal transformation. Although former sources of domestic 
instability, such as Timor-Leste and the provinces of Aceh in Indonesia and Bougainville in Papua 
New Guinea “are in the consolidating phase after their respective conflicts,”353 many internal and 
volatile conflicts within various countries continue to simmer and remain unresolved. Conflict within 
Myanmar, Fiji, Southern Thailand, Mindanao in the Philippines and Papua in Indonesia are all in a 
phase of questionable stability as separatist insurgencies, fuelled by the intensity of their enduring 
grievances, seek to change the political status quo in their respective countries. These grievances are 
deeply internalised, have an ethnic or religious dimension and span a variety of societal issues, 
namely: representation, access to resource-derived revenues, and employment opportunities. 
These internal disputes mark flashpoints within each region and have the capacity to alter the 
dynamics of the RSC and lead to internal transformation. The way in which individual countries cope 
with their internal security concerns is relevant beyond the individual country itself as these actions 
reflect on the units of the RSC and the effectiveness of its institutional framework. Despite the ethos 
of non-intervention in both ASEAN and the PIF, human security concerns are playing an increasingly 
significant role in the relationship between the organisational body and its members. Fiji’s expulsion 
from the PIF in 2009 represents one such incident as human security took priority over Forum 
solidarity. Fiji’s expulsion has lead to a minor internal transformation in the region in which polarity 
has become more balanced but patterns of enmity have increased. In a similar vein, ASEAN’s open 
condemnation of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 marked a minor internal transformation in 
ASEAN’s history as it represented progress towards acknowledging sensitive security issues that had 
previously been brushed aside.354 
6.7.4 Interregional Interaction and the Probability of External Transformation  
The evolution of Southeast Asia’s regional security architecture has been the most successful in the 
developing world and “attempts at regional cooperation elsewhere... notably Africa, Latin America, 
and the Middle East, have not fared any better, and in most cases have lagged further behind.”355 
ASEAN involvement in this process has been critical and ASEAN has established a level of credibility 
in East Asia as well as on the international level. As a result, ASEAN’s capacity to drive interregional 
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interaction has strengthened and continues to raise questions about the viability of an external 
transformation. Possible scenarios for external transformation of the region include: the Asia-Pacific 
region being more interdependently linked into the core of the complex;356 the merging of the three 
Asian sub-complexes into an Asian supercomplex; and also the potential for the Asia-Pacific, with the 
inclusion of the South Pacific, transforming into a complex in and of itself. Buzan argues that an 
external transformation, whilst rare and difficult, is possible and that “alterations in the processes of 
(de)securitisation”357 can lead to complex boundary changes and vice versa. The increasing strength 
of the Asia-Pacific multilateral security architecture, with ASEAN at the core, has shown signs of 
growth, stability and solidifying its hold on the region. In the past decade, with the ARF, EAS, ADMM-
Plus, this stability has been evolving outwards358 and there is a distinct possibility that this will 
continue to develop and strengthen. 
China’s expanding influence into the regional dynamics of both Southeast Asia and the South Pacific 
is an important variable in the development of an Asia-Pacific complex. The economic and 
geostrategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region has accelerated in the past several decades and 
this has served to strengthen the interdependence between the wider region’s diverse and 
geographically fragmented units. In Southeast Asia this has led to significant cooperation between 
China and ASEAN in response to non-traditional security concerns.359 However, and if this trend were 
to lead to a tightly interlinked supercomplex, several variables must be considered, namely: the 
competitive or complementary actions of China and the United States and, to some degree, the role 
of India and Japan. There is now a significant focus on China and India as they “both compete for 
energy markets, diplomatic influence and naval access”360 within Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia’s 
geopolitical landscape is of central importance as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea are 
strategically vital and the former is the pathway through which an estimated 30 per cent of world 
trade travels every year.361 Furthermore, maritime disputes between China and other Southeast 
Asian claimants in regards to the Spratly islands, in addition to disputes with Japan, have also 
impacted on the wider geopolitical landscape of the region. Needless to say, and although the 
scenarios for Asia’s transformation are relatively narrow, “it remains the case that the two crucial 
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variables on which the future of Asian security depends – China and the USA – are fundamentally 
indeterminate.”362  
6.8 Historical patterns of development: the influence of history and the legacy of state formation.  
6.8.1 Influence of History and the Legacy of State Formation 
There is no doubt that the legacy of history matters in the construction of RSCs and Southeast Asia 
and the South Pacific are two cases in point. In both regions the influence of history has had a 
twofold effect. First, on the domestic level, state formation amidst the climate of decolonisation has 
negatively impacted on the establishment of civil society and political structuring. This legacy has 
resulted in a significant number of internal conflicts in both regions on the basis that territorial 
boundaries were arbitrarily defined by former colonial powers and, furthermore, the impact of the 
Cold War saw both regions have little control over determining the initial structure of their regional 
order. Second, on a regional level, the historical context has resulted in an “inbuilt resistance to 
action and institutional reform.”363 National sovereignty has remained paramount on the agenda of 
states within both complexes and has severely hindered the successful mitigation of transnational 
security issues which require compromise over issues of autonomy and sovereignty.     
A significant portion of states within Southeast Asia and the South Pacific are weak states. State 
formation within the historical context of both regions has seen that, whilst state structures in some 
cases may be strong and seemingly legitimate, much of the ‘idea’ of the state is lacking. In the 
process of state formation there has been a discrepancy between what the state and nation 
represent and as a result societies have been divided along ethnic or religious lines and civil/political 
unrest has ensued. Prominent examples include: religion driven violence in the outer provinces of 
Indonesia; separatist violence in Mindanao, Southern Philippines; ethnic separatist violence in 
Southern Thailand; ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea; and ethnically 
driven political conflict in Fiji which has resulted in three coups since the country’s independence. All 
of these instances exemplify internal groups fighting for self-determination and an alternative ‘idea’ 
of the state. 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific have both suffered from the legacy of their history. However, 
Southeast Asia, assisted by its vast economic growth, has managed to push beyond its historical 
baggage and formulate an institutional framework with ideals that help work around its conflictual 
history. By contrast, the South Pacific is still burdened by its legacy and history. The South Pacific is 
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dominated entirely by weak states and this continues to influence the character and the weakness of 
its RSC. 
6.8.2 Common Historical Patterns of Development 
Both regions have had similar experiences in the history of their development, albeit Southeast 
Asia’s experiences have been significantly more intense than the South Pacific’s. Both regions 
emerged as clusters of fragile post-colonial states that had shared security needs and concerns, but 
also historical antagonistic relations which made their interdependent needs difficult to manage. 
Domestic constraints, as well as external ones relating to the impact of the Cold War, limited the 
ability of both to establish a locally driven regional order and sense of regional identity.  
A significant commonality in the historical development of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific is 
that they have had to simultaneously endure the formation of state structures as well as regional 
structures. Institutionalism, as a result, has been slow, has lacked a legal personality and has placed 
individual autonomy and sovereignty at the centre of its ethos. It is no accident that security 
communities have flourished in areas comprised of post-modern and industrially advanced states 
such as Europe where state structures were already well defined.  
Whilst the pattern and variables for development have been similar between the two regions it has 
been the economic element that has seen Southeast Asia flourish and truly take hold of its regional 
security environment.  
6.9 The interplay between the global and regional level dynamic and the end of the Cold War  
 
6.9.1 The Relationship between Global and Regional Level Dynamic 
 
The relationship between the global and the regional dynamic differs for both regions. ASEAN has a 
strong command on the dynamics of Southeast Asia and has the capacity to influence the engagement 
of outside actors. Consequently, the global level does not alter the inner dynamic of the region, the 
regional level maintains relative autonomy and the global level merely supplements its dynamic. A 
source of potential disruption is the rise of China and its encroaching claims on the South China Sea as 
this, coupled with the re-engagement of the United States in the region, could see ASEAN’s control 
waver if the U.S-China dynamic becomes one of rivalry in Southeast Asia and ASEAN gets dragged into 
the competition. In order for ASEAN to retain control of the region the United States needs to be 
integrated into the region as an equalizer and not a balancer. All regional units will benefit from a 
cooperative global power dynamic and not a competitive one. 
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The South Pacific, by contrast, does not have the economic autonomy or the institutional strength to 
disaggregate the regional level dynamic from the global level: whereby the South Pacific relies heavily 
on outsider attention for aid packages, business investment and resources and is willing to welcome 
global level dynamics playing out within the region. Chinese influence in the region has steadily 
increased in the past two decades and China has become a valuable aid and loan donor for many 
Pacific Island nations. In particular, Chinese companies have taken a keen interest in investing in 
Pacific resources such as timber, fish and minerals.364 
 
6.9.2 Lessons from the End of the Cold War 
 
The end of the Cold War has markedly changed the shape and scope of security studies; particularly in 
regards to security in the Third World. The widening and deepening of security has facilitated a 
broader analysis of what constitutes security and what is required to attain it. Both Southeast Asia and 
the South Pacific exemplify the need to look beyond traditional perspectives on security. Within both 
regions, non-military threats threaten both domestic and regional security regime survival more so 
than traditional threats.  
 
The end of the Cold War has seen the role of economic prosperity become an important factor in the 
security equation. The more politically fragile the state the more it is limited in its capacities and 
depends on economic growth for legitimacy; thereby the relationship between economic and internal 
stability and political legitimacy is heightened. The crucial lesson learnt from this change is how 
binding economic security can be on a regional level. Cooperation-centred ‘prosper-with-thy-
neighbour’ logic is driven by self-interest, not altruism, and this ensures compliance to institutional 
rules and norms more so than a common ideational philosophy. As Buzan argues, “economic factors 
do play a role in determining both the power of states within their local complex, and their domestic 
instability and cohesion as actors. They may also play an important role in motivating the patterns of 
external interest in the local complex... and they can affect the prospects for regional integration, 
which can influence how a given security complex evolves.”365 
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Chapter Seven - Conclusion 
The end of the Cold War marks a significant turning point in the role of regionalism and regional 
security arrangements in the study of International Relations. Proponents of the regionalist 
perspective have sought to highlight the existence of regional subsystems which are not only 
autonomous from the global system, but are unique and embody the distinctive relationship 
between the geographical proximity of its units and the nature of their security. The regional level 
occupies a space between the level of the state and the international system and, on the basis of 
proximity and shared historical and geographical roots, regional subsystems encapsulate an 
exclusive regional dynamic derived from balance of power relations and patterns of amity and 
enmity of its units.366 
So as to map the relationship between regional clusters of states and their pursuit of security, Buzan 
and Waever offer the idea that the security of states in close geographical proximity to each other 
has a tendency to be linked sufficiently close together that their security environment cannot be 
considered in isolation from one another. The term ‘regional security complex’ has been coined by 
Buzan and Waever and is used to describe “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, 
desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably 
analysed or resolved apart from one another.”367 The purpose of RSCT is to offer a conceptual 
framework that accounts for the centrality of geographical variables. The analysis of RSCs as regional 
substructures helps to highlight how territorially based security dynamics can account for patterns of 
behaviour within a regional context and provide a more beneficial understanding of its origin; be it 
conflict or cooperation. RSCT stresses that, in spite of modern advancements in technology and 
transportation, the interplay between anarchy and geography remains paramount and a distinctive 
web of security interdependence facilitates the emergence of a regionally coherent subsystem.  
The existence of a RSC is not arbitrarily defined, nor is its presence fixed, and depending on the 
configuration of its units it can take on many different forms. RSCT offers four variables which 
embody the essential structure of a RSC and determines its particular type: ranging from conflict 
formation, security regime to security community, and standard to centred. Whilst different forms of 
RSCs may exist, one factor remains consistent: overlapping security concerns are more intensely felt 
between those within the complex than those outside. Subsequently, and in order for states to 
successfully combat the threats experienced across a wider region, durable stability and security is 
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only achievable through some form of cooperation and coordination by all actors; insofar that 
threats cannot be wholly mitigated unless all securitizing actors approach the issue in an organised 
and harmonized manner. In the post-Cold War era, regionalism has emerged as a mechanism for 
coping with regional patterns of security. The broadening of the security agenda has also 
acknowledged the increasingly transnational nature of security threats, in which the facilitation of 
peace and security hinge on coordination within a regional context. The rise of regionalism has 
resulted in the prevalence of multilateral institution building at the regional level throughout the 
world, albeit in different forms and with varied success.  
The purpose of RSCT is to provide a theoretical framework that highlights the distinct structural 
nature of individual regional spaces, thereby enabling the identification of mutually exclusive 
constructs and the processes responsible for altering the dynamics within its geopolitical context. 
Buzan and Waever suggest that the existence of RSCs rests on four particular variables: boundary, 
anarchic structure, polarity and social construction. Furthermore, in the absence of satisfying these 
variables, a regional space may be deemed unstructured, whereby the security interactions are so 
weak that no regional structure exists.  Buzan and Waever suggest that the South Pacific represents 
a prototypical example of an unstructured region and, as a result, the goal of this thesis has been to 
explore the extent to which this statement holds true. The aim of this thesis has been twofold: first, 
to question and analyse the extent to which the dynamics of essential structure of the South Pacific 
are too weak to classify it as a RSC and, second to cross-compare the regional spaces of Southeast 
Asia and the South Pacific and show what any differences may indicate about the complexes 
themselves.  
The contrasting roles of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific in RSCT literature make this cross-
comparison valuable. Southeast Asia has typically been regarded as a representation of a 
prototypical RSC and the evolution of ASEAN has been hailed as one of the most successful pursuits 
of non-western regionalism. The South Pacific, by comparison, is a relatively new interest area. 
Contextual commonalities across both regions has ensured that a strong basis for cross-comparison 
exists as both are comprised of traditionally non-western nation-states whom, due to decolonisation 
and Cold War overlay, have suffered from the effects of history and the legacy of state formation. As 
a result, regional level cooperation has emerged as a representation of regional self-determination 
and as a means of facilitating peace and security, and regionalism has flourished. 
A significant finding that has challenged the researcher’s pre-existing view has been that although 
the South Pacific has a lengthy history of regionalism, regionalism has not been established in a way 
that is fully compatible with the history and culture of the region and, as a result, has led to its 
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stagnated evolution. The South Pacific is a unique regional space. The majority of the units within 
region are now independent, with a strong sense of their own Pacific ideals and regionalizing beliefs 
about what it will take to develop the ‘extended Pacific family.’ The South Pacific, however, lacks the 
mutual exclusivity required of a RSC to develop the dynamics of a regional construct that is derived 
entirely from within the region. The perpetual political and economic weakness of its units ensures 
that the region is still very heavily indebted to New Zealand and Australia, as funding and 
infrastructural limitations ensure that regional needs cannot be met from within the region. The 
extent to which both New Zealand and Australia are a part of the region, but who have the capacity 
to disengage, distorts the conceptualisation of the region’s current structure. The boundary of the 
region and its polarity remain ambiguous. Regionalism in the South Pacific, in many respects, has 
been forced and is not necessarily congruent with island practices and beliefs. Instead, it is more 
aligned with Western perceptions of how regional security and stability may be achieved. It is 
difficult to say what evolutionary path South Pacific regionalism, and the Pacific Islands Forum, may 
have taken in the complete absence of outside influence.  
This, however, is not to detract from the contribution the PIF has made to developing a sense of 
regional cohesion. The evolution of the Forum from the SPC to the PIF has been a fundamental step 
in the transformation of the region and, in many regards, represents the decolonisation of South 
Pacific regionalism and an affirmation of Pacific Islands’ sovereignty. The South Pacific is unique 
insofar that regionalism and the establishment of the PIF has grown to symbolise the independence 
and autonomy of South Pacific regionalism from colonial and neo-colonial influences. Conversely, 
regionalism typically represents a compromise between the units within a RSC. Regionalism has 
continued as a means of asserting the self-determination of the Pacific Islands, more so than as a 
means of counteracting regional interdependence. New Zealand and Australia continue to maintain 
an important role in the regional dynamic. They do not, however, maintain a definitive role. 
Nonetheless, and as Greg Fry argues, “because the term ‘regionalism’ has become something of a 
mantra for solving problems beyond the national level, and the Pacific Islands Forum was the model 
and the paramount decision-making body, probably more reliance has been focused at that level 
than has been justified.”368 As such, the latest PIF initiative, the Pacific Plan, is still experiencing 
significant challenges five years on, and whether it has been a success is still difficult to ascertain.    
A further significant finding has been the extent to which the rhetoric and fanfare surrounding 
ASEAN initiatives has not necessarily been consistent with policy outcomes. The evolution of 
regionalism has significantly changed the shape of Southeast Asia, and conflict between states is 
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now minimal and reserved. In reality, however, the securitization of threats has been extremely slow 
and national self-interest still largely prevails. Only certain issues, namely those that have emerged 
as being increasingly imminent existential threats, have been successfully elevated to the level of 
regional securitization and other concerns, which are sensitive and/or interlinked more with internal 
domestic issues, have typically been avoided. The Southeast Asian RSC, however, is so intensely 
developed that the security cooperation between its units will continue to dominate the regional 
dynamic irrespective of its complications. The key obstacles facing Southeast Asian regionalism will 
be for ASEAN to sustain its centrality in spite of the expanding security architecture and the extent to 
which ASEAN can reconcile the geographical caveat in the conceptualisation of the region that is 
represented by the absence of Timor-Leste as a full member of ASEAN.         
Both regions share a contextual commonality in that “since the end of the Cold War, low-level 
violence has been the prevailing type of conflict....[and] this has arguably contributed to the 
fragmented nature of conflict prevention in the region.”369 Regionalism, in spite its contribution to 
harmonizing relations, has not provided a framework for coping with internal conflicts that 
permeate the regional level. Internal sources of insecurity have been dealt with in an ad hoc fashion 
and on a case by case basis: typically because outside sources have demanded some form of action 
from their respective regional institution. The evolutionary stagnation of both regional institutions 
rests with the fact that nationalism and self-preservation are paramount. The implementation of 
securitization is only as valuable as the sum of its parts, and the extent to which not all members are 
committed to bridging the gap between policy and practice is a fundamental problem.   
Lastly, this cross-comparison has highlighted that whilst both regions share similar commonalities 
and lengthy histories of regionalism, the underlying foundation of regional cooperation has varied 
significantly. This has resulted in Southeast Asia’s transformation being significantly more apparent 
than that of the South Pacific. In the case of Southeast Asia, the intensity of interdependence has 
ensured that regionalism has emerged as the by-product of a deep RSC. Thus, limiting competition 
and conflict has been a fundamental and functional necessity. By contrast, in the South Pacific 
competition and conflict at the regional level, and between states, has been far less problematic 
than internal conflict between tribes or ethnicities within states. South Pacific regionalism did not 
initially emerge as an indication of a distinct regional dynamic, and it was not until 1999 with the 
transformation of the SPC to the PIF that regionalism grew to symbolise regional self-determination. 
The process of regionalism has occurred out of necessity in some regards, but also out of desire. As a 
result, the regional level is not wholly autonomous like its Southeast Asian counterpart and the 
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regional dynamic is easily impinged on and subject to the imposition of outside beliefs and 
standards.370   
It has become apparent that a main area for further development is the conceptualisation of the 
‘Asia-Pacific’ as a region and an analysis of its growing role in international relations. Asian influences 
in the South Pacific have steadily risen over the last decade and the potential for an external 
transformation that will see a stronger and wider regional dynamic emerge is a possible, albeit 
distant, reality. Arguably, “the Asia Pacific region is fast becoming a core area, if not the core area, in 
the international system. A new regional architecture is required to help frame the cooperation with 
the Asia-Pacific core as well as shape regional strategies towards global issues.”371 The rise of China 
and its capacity to exacerbate “dramatic shifts in regional power dynamics”372 will, inevitably, create 
new uncertainties. The impact of growing Chinese influence has already been felt throughout the 
South Pacific and Southeast Asia and, in the wake of renewed American engagement,373 the Asia-
Pacific area may, once again, prove to be the theatre for global power rivalry.  
In conclusion, and as has been posited in this thesis, the importance of the regional level in the post-
Cold War era is unparalleled. Regionalism and multilateral institution building has become a 
significant feature of interstate patterns of interaction and have paved the way for highlighting both 
the prominence of regionally coherent security dynamics, and also the need for cooperation in the 
pursuit of stability and security. The South Pacific has made significant progress in asserting the self-
determination of its regional construct. The kinship and cooperation present at the regional level 
through its preeminent institution, the PIF, is undeniable. However, the web of interdependence 
that links its units together in an intense and pragmatic way is lacking. The South Pacific is, at best, a 
very weak form of security complex.  
The most significant contribution made by this thesis is it’s the unique application of RSCT to the 
dynamics of the South Pacific. This has helped to highlight formative issues in the establishment of 
South Pacific regionalism and the extent to which the region’s ambiguous positioning on the RSC 
spectrum has impinged on its ability to obtain regional stability and security. Arguably, a distinct 
regional security architecture does exist and elements of interdependence do bind the fate of its 
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units together. This is to say that the South Pacific is not entirely unstructured, and on a superficial 
level the region may sufficiently fulfil the requirements of the essential structure of a RSC. In reality, 
however, the regional level is not entirely responsible for its own security dynamic. The South Pacific 
fails to meet the most fundamental feature of a RSC: that the regional dynamic is “substantially self-
contained not in the sense of being totally free-standing, but rather in possessing a security dynamic 
that would exist even if other actors did not impinge on it.”374  
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